Daily Papers

The presence of decision-making algorithms in society is rapidly increasing nowadays, while concerns about their transparency and the possibility of these algorithms becoming new sources of discrimination are arising. In fact, many relevant automated systems have been shown to make decisions based on sensitive information or discriminate certain social groups (e.g. certain biometric systems for person recognition). With the aim of studying how current multimodal algorithms based on heterogeneous sources of information are affected by sensitive elements and inner biases in the data, we propose a fictitious automated recruitment testbed: FairCVtest. We train automatic recruitment algorithms using a set of multimodal synthetic profiles consciously scored with gender and racial biases. FairCVtest shows the capacity of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) behind such recruitment tool to extract sensitive information from unstructured data, and exploit it in combination to data biases in undesirable (unfair) ways. Finally, we present a list of recent works developing techniques capable of removing sensitive information from the decision-making process of deep learning architectures. We have used one of these algorithms (SensitiveNets) to experiment discrimination-aware learning for the elimination of sensitive information in our multimodal AI framework. Our methodology and results show how to generate fairer AI-based tools in general, and in particular fairer automated recruitment systems.

Large pre-trained language models have become popular for many applications and form an important backbone of many downstream tasks in natural language processing (NLP). Applying 'explainable artificial intelligence' (XAI) techniques to enrich such models' outputs is considered crucial for assuring their quality and shedding light on their inner workings. However, large language models are trained on a plethora of data containing a variety of biases, such as gender biases, affecting model weights and, potentially, behavior. Currently, it is unclear to what extent such biases also impact model explanations in possibly unfavorable ways. We create a gender-controlled text dataset, GECO, in which otherwise identical sentences appear in male and female forms. This gives rise to ground-truth 'world explanations' for gender classification tasks, enabling the objective evaluation of the correctness of XAI methods. We also provide GECOBench, a rigorous quantitative evaluation framework benchmarking popular XAI methods, applying them to pre-trained language models fine-tuned to different degrees. This allows us to investigate how pre-training induces undesirable bias in model explanations and to what extent fine-tuning can mitigate such explanation bias. We show a clear dependency between explanation performance and the number of fine-tuned layers, where XAI methods are observed to particularly benefit from fine-tuning or complete retraining of embedding layers. Remarkably, this relationship holds for models achieving similar classification performance on the same task. With that, we highlight the utility of the proposed gender-controlled dataset and novel benchmarking approach for research and development of novel XAI methods. All code including dataset generation, model training, evaluation and visualization is available at: https://github.com/braindatalab/gecobench

Many problems in machine learning involve bilevel optimization (BLO), including hyperparameter optimization, meta-learning, and dataset distillation. Bilevel problems consist of two nested sub-problems, called the outer and inner problems, respectively. In practice, often at least one of these sub-problems is overparameterized. In this case, there are many ways to choose among optima that achieve equivalent objective values. Inspired by recent studies of the implicit bias induced by optimization algorithms in single-level optimization, we investigate the implicit bias of gradient-based algorithms for bilevel optimization. We delineate two standard BLO methods -- cold-start and warm-start -- and show that the converged solution or long-run behavior depends to a large degree on these and other algorithmic choices, such as the hypergradient approximation. We also show that the inner solutions obtained by warm-start BLO can encode a surprising amount of information about the outer objective, even when the outer parameters are low-dimensional. We believe that implicit bias deserves as central a role in the study of bilevel optimization as it has attained in the study of single-level neural net optimization.

AI Agents can perform complex operations at great speed, but just like all the humans we have ever hired, their intelligence remains fallible. Miscommunications aren't noticed, systemic biases have no counter-action, and inner monologues are rarely written down. We did not come to fire them for their mistakes, but to hire them and provide a safe productive working environment. We posit that we can reuse a common corporate organizational structure: teams of independent AI agents with strict role boundaries can work with common goals, but opposing incentives. Multiple models serving as a team of rivals can catch and minimize errors within the final product at a small cost to the velocity of actions. In this paper we demonstrate that we can achieve reliability without acquiring perfect components, but through careful orchestration of imperfect ones. This paper describes the architecture of such a system in practice: specialized agent teams (planners, executors, critics, experts), organized into an organization with clear goals, coordinated through a remote code executor that keeps data transformations and tool invocations separate from reasoning models. Rather than agents directly calling tools and ingesting full responses, they write code that executes remotely; only relevant summaries return to agent context. By preventing raw data and tool outputs from contaminating context windows, the system maintains clean separation between perception (brains that plan and reason) and execution (hands that perform heavy data transformations and API calls). We demonstrate the approach achieves over 90% internal error interception prior to user exposure while maintaining acceptable latency tradeoffs. A survey from our traces shows that we only trade off cost and latency to achieve correctness and incrementally expand capabilities without impacting existing ones.

Early in development, children learn to extend novel category labels to objects with the same shape, a phenomenon known as the shape bias. Inspired by these findings, Geirhos et al. (2019) examined whether deep neural networks show a shape or texture bias by constructing images with conflicting shape and texture cues. They found that convolutional neural networks strongly preferred to classify familiar objects based on texture as opposed to shape, suggesting a texture bias. However, there are a number of differences between how the networks were tested in this study versus how children are typically tested. In this work, we re-examine the inductive biases of neural networks by adapting the stimuli and procedure from Geirhos et al. (2019) to more closely follow the developmental paradigm and test on a wide range of pre-trained neural networks. Across three experiments, we find that deep neural networks exhibit a preference for shape rather than texture when tested under conditions that more closely replicate the developmental procedure.

Subliminal learning describes a student language model inheriting a behavioral bias by fine-tuning on seemingly innocuous data generated by a biased teacher model. Prior work has begun to characterize this phenomenon but leaves open questions about the scope of signals it can transfer, the mechanisms that explain it, and the precision with which a bias can be encoded by seemingly unrelated data. We tackle all three problems by introducing subliminal steering, a variant of subliminal learning in which the teacher's bias is implemented not via a system prompt, as in prior work, but through a steering vector trained to maximize the likelihood of a set of target samples. First, we show that subliminal steering transfers complex multi-word biases, whereas prior work focused on single-word preferences, demonstrating a large scope of subliminally transferrable signals. Second, we provide mechanistic evidence that subliminal learning transfers not only the target behavioral bias, but also the steering vector itself, localized to the layers at which the teacher was steered. Finally, we show that the bias is encoded with surprising precision. We train a new steering vector directly on the subliminally-laden dataset and find that it attains high cosine similarity with the original vector.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

The initial state of neural networks plays a central role in conditioning the subsequent training dynamics. In the context of classification problems, we provide a theoretical analysis demonstrating that the structure of a neural network can condition the model to assign all predictions to the same class, even before the beginning of training, and in the absence of explicit biases. We show that the presence of this phenomenon, which we call "Initial Guessing Bias" (IGB), depends on architectural choices such as activation functions, max-pooling layers, and network depth. Our analysis of IGB has practical consequences, in that it guides architecture selection and initialization. We also highlight theoretical consequences, such as the breakdown of node-permutation symmetry, the violation of self-averaging, the validity of some mean-field approximations, and the non-trivial differences arising with depth.

Bias in Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly undermines their reliability and fairness. We focus on a common form of bias: when two reference concepts in the model's concept space, such as sentiment polarities (e.g., "positive" and "negative"), are asymmetrically correlated with a third, target concept, such as a reviewing aspect, the model exhibits unintended bias. For instance, the understanding of "food" should not skew toward any particular sentiment. Existing bias evaluation methods assess behavioral differences of LLMs by constructing labeled data for different social groups and measuring model responses across them, a process that requires substantial human effort and captures only a limited set of social concepts. To overcome these limitations, we propose BiasLens, a test-set-free bias analysis framework based on the structure of the model's vector space. BiasLens combines Concept Activation Vectors (CAVs) with Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to extract interpretable concept representations, and quantifies bias by measuring the variation in representational similarity between the target concept and each of the reference concepts. Even without labeled data, BiasLens shows strong agreement with traditional bias evaluation metrics (Spearman correlation r > 0.85). Moreover, BiasLens reveals forms of bias that are difficult to detect using existing methods. For example, in simulated clinical scenarios, a patient's insurance status can cause the LLM to produce biased diagnostic assessments. Overall, BiasLens offers a scalable, interpretable, and efficient paradigm for bias discovery, paving the way for improving fairness and transparency in LLMs.

We generalize the notion of social biases from language embeddings to grounded vision and language embeddings. Biases are present in grounded embeddings, and indeed seem to be equally or more significant than for ungrounded embeddings. This is despite the fact that vision and language can suffer from different biases, which one might hope could attenuate the biases in both. Multiple ways exist to generalize metrics measuring bias in word embeddings to this new setting. We introduce the space of generalizations (Grounded-WEAT and Grounded-SEAT) and demonstrate that three generalizations answer different yet important questions about how biases, language, and vision interact. These metrics are used on a new dataset, the first for grounded bias, created by augmenting extending standard linguistic bias benchmarks with 10,228 images from COCO, Conceptual Captions, and Google Images. Dataset construction is challenging because vision datasets are themselves very biased. The presence of these biases in systems will begin to have real-world consequences as they are deployed, making carefully measuring bias and then mitigating it critical to building a fair society.

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4 and Gemini have significantly advanced artificial intelligence by enabling machines to generate and comprehend human-like text. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs are not immune to limitations, including various biases. While much research has explored demographic biases, the cognitive biases in LLMs have not been equally scrutinized. This study delves into anchoring bias, a cognitive bias where initial information disproportionately influences judgment. Utilizing an experimental dataset, we examine how anchoring bias manifests in LLMs and verify the effectiveness of various mitigation strategies. Our findings highlight the sensitivity of LLM responses to biased hints. At the same time, our experiments show that, to mitigate anchoring bias, one needs to collect hints from comprehensive angles to prevent the LLMs from being anchored to individual pieces of information, while simple algorithms such as Chain-of-Thought, Thoughts of Principles, Ignoring Anchor Hints, and Reflection are not sufficient.

Despite being home to more than 1300 ethnic groups and 700 indigenous languages, bias in Large Language Models has not been fully studied in Indonesia, thus leaving a critical gap in evaluating representational fairness and localized stereotypes within its uniquely vast, multilingual, and diverse sociocultural landscape. To address this, we introduce IndoBias as a culturally-grounded bias benchmark to assess LLMs bias in Indonesian and three local languages: Javanese, Sundanese, and Makasar. IndoBias features dual perspective evaluation tracks: depth-oriented (with contrastive-pairs) and breadth-oriented (with generation-based), where the latter is grounded in social science frameworks (SPI, O*NET, and WGI). Our results show that existing LLMs -- particularly decoder models -- exhibit strong bias towards prototypical sentences in Indonesian, while local languages suffer higher bias under Ideology and Religion category. We also find that LLMs responses exhibit a non-uniform Stereotype Polarity when prompted with various local entities. Finally, we discover that, in Indonesian, Common Crawl texts introduce more bias during pretraining, compared to human-reviewed article texts (e.g., Wikipedia, News), whereas introducing local languages to pretraining generally increases bias. This work highlights the importance of studying bias in culture-specific context. Warning: This paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

Our understanding of the generalization capabilities of neural networks (NNs) is still incomplete. Prevailing explanations are based on implicit biases of gradient descent (GD) but they cannot account for the capabilities of models from gradient-free methods nor the simplicity bias recently observed in untrained networks. This paper seeks other sources of generalization in NNs. Findings. To understand the inductive biases provided by architectures independently from GD, we examine untrained, random-weight networks. Even simple MLPs show strong inductive biases: uniform sampling in weight space yields a very biased distribution of functions in terms of complexity. But unlike common wisdom, NNs do not have an inherent "simplicity bias". This property depends on components such as ReLUs, residual connections, and layer normalizations. Alternative architectures can be built with a bias for any level of complexity. Transformers also inherit all these properties from their building blocks. Implications. We provide a fresh explanation for the success of deep learning independent from gradient-based training. It points at promising avenues for controlling the solutions implemented by trained models.

Recent advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on standard visual reasoning benchmarks. However, there is growing concern that these models rely excessively on linguistic shortcuts rather than genuine visual grounding, a phenomenon we term Text Bias. In this paper, we investigate the fundamental tension between visual perception and linguistic priors. We decouple the sources of this bias into two dimensions: Internal Corpus Bias, stemming from statistical correlations in pretraining, and External Instruction Bias, arising from the alignment-induced tendency toward sycophancy. To quantify this effect, we introduce V-FAT (Visual Fidelity Against Text-bias), a diagnostic benchmark comprising 4,026 VQA instances across six semantic domains. V-FAT employs a Three-Level Evaluation Framework that systematically increases the conflict between visual evidence and textual information: (L1) internal bias from atypical images, (L2) external bias from misleading instructions, and (L3) synergistic bias where both coincide. We introduce the Visual Robustness Score (VRS), a metric designed to penalize "lucky" linguistic guesses and reward true visual fidelity. Our evaluation of 12 frontier MLLMs reveals that while models excel in existing benchmarks, they experience significant visual collapse under high linguistic dominance.

Cognitive biases often shape human decisions. While large language models (LLMs) have been shown to reproduce well-known biases, a more critical question is whether LLMs can predict biases at the individual level and emulate the dynamics of biased human behavior when contextual factors, such as cognitive load, interact with these biases. We adapted three well-established decision scenarios into a conversational setting and conducted a human experiment (N=1100). Participants engaged with a chatbot that facilitates decision-making through simple or complex dialogues. Results revealed robust biases. To evaluate how LLMs emulate human decision-making under similar interactive conditions, we used participant demographics and dialogue transcripts to simulate these conditions with LLMs based on GPT-4 and GPT-5. The LLMs reproduced human biases with precision. We found notable differences between models in how they aligned human behavior. This has important implications for designing and evaluating adaptive, bias-aware LLM-based AI systems in interactive contexts.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear. In this work, we investigated whether the well-known Knobe effect, a moral bias in intentionality judgements, emerges in finetuned LLMs and whether it can be traced back to specific components of the model. We conducted a Layer-Patching analysis across 3 open-weights LLMs and demonstrated that the bias is not only learned during finetuning but also localized in a specific set of layers. Surprisingly, we found that patching activations from the corresponding pretrained model into just a few critical layers is sufficient to eliminate the effect. Our findings offer new evidence that social biases in LLMs can be interpreted, localized, and mitigated through targeted interventions, without the need for model retraining.

Diffusion models have demonstrated impressive capabilities in synthesizing diverse content. However, despite their high-quality outputs, these models often perpetuate social biases, including those related to gender and race. These biases can potentially contribute to harmful real-world consequences, reinforcing stereotypes and exacerbating inequalities in various social contexts. While existing research on diffusion bias mitigation has predominantly focused on guiding content generation, it often neglects the intrinsic mechanisms within diffusion models that causally drive biased outputs. In this paper, we investigate the internal processes of diffusion models, identifying specific decision-making mechanisms, termed bias features, embedded within the model architecture. By directly manipulating these features, our method precisely isolates and adjusts the elements responsible for bias generation, permitting granular control over the bias levels in the generated content. Through experiments on both unconditional and conditional diffusion models across various social bias attributes, we demonstrate our method's efficacy in managing generation distribution while preserving image quality. We also dissect the discovered model mechanism, revealing different intrinsic features controlling fine-grained aspects of generation, boosting further research on mechanistic interpretability of diffusion models.

The impressive performance of language models is undeniable. However, the presence of biases based on gender, race, socio-economic status, physical appearance, and sexual orientation makes the deployment of language models challenging. This paper studies the effect of chain-of-thought prompting, a recent approach that studies the steps followed by the model before it responds, on fairness. More specifically, we ask the following question: Do biased models have biased thoughts? To answer our question, we conduct experiments on 5 popular large language models using fairness metrics to quantify 11 different biases in the model's thoughts and output. Our results show that the bias in the thinking steps is not highly correlated with the output bias (less than 0.6 correlation with a p-value smaller than 0.001 in most cases). In other words, unlike human beings, the tested models with biased decisions do not always possess biased thoughts.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT has advanced natural language processing, yet concerns about cognitive biases are growing. In this paper, we investigate the anchoring effect, a cognitive bias where the mind relies heavily on the first information as anchors to make affected judgments. We explore whether LLMs are affected by anchoring, the underlying mechanisms, and potential mitigation strategies. To facilitate studies at scale on the anchoring effect, we introduce a new dataset, SynAnchors. Combining refined evaluation metrics, we benchmark current widely used LLMs. Our findings show that LLMs' anchoring bias exists commonly with shallow-layer acting and is not eliminated by conventional strategies, while reasoning can offer some mitigation. This recontextualization via cognitive psychology urges that LLM evaluations focus not on standard benchmarks or over-optimized robustness tests, but on cognitive-bias-aware trustworthy evaluation.

This paper argues that deep neural networks (DNNs) mostly determine their outputs during the early stages of inference, where biases inherent in the model play a crucial role in shaping this process. We draw a parallel between this phenomenon and human decision-making, which often relies on fast, intuitive heuristics. Using diffusion models (DMs) as a case study, we demonstrate that DNNs often make early-stage decision-making influenced by the type and extent of bias in their design and training. Our findings offer a new perspective on bias mitigation, efficient inference, and the interpretation of machine learning systems. By identifying the temporal dynamics of decision-making in DNNs, this paper aims to inspire further discussion and research within the machine learning community.

Self-evaluation using large language models (LLMs) has proven valuable not only in benchmarking but also methods like reward modeling, constitutional AI, and self-refinement. But new biases are introduced due to the same LLM acting as both the evaluator and the evaluatee. One such bias is self-preference, where an LLM evaluator scores its own outputs higher than others' while human annotators consider them of equal quality. But do LLMs actually recognize their own outputs when they give those texts higher scores, or is it just a coincidence? In this paper, we investigate if self-recognition capability contributes to self-preference. We discover that, out of the box, LLMs such as GPT-4 and Llama 2 have non-trivial accuracy at distinguishing themselves from other LLMs and humans. By fine-tuning LLMs, we discover a linear correlation between self-recognition capability and the strength of self-preference bias; using controlled experiments, we show that the causal explanation resists straightforward confounders. We discuss how self-recognition can interfere with unbiased evaluations and AI safety more generally.

In this work we revisit the most fundamental building block in deep learning, the multi-layer perceptron (MLP), and study the limits of its performance on vision tasks. Empirical insights into MLPs are important for multiple reasons. (1) Given the recent narrative "less inductive bias is better", popularized due to transformers eclipsing convolutional models, it is natural to explore the limits of this hypothesis. To that end, MLPs offer an ideal test bed, being completely free of any inductive bias. (2) MLPs have almost exclusively been the main protagonist in the deep learning theory literature due to their mathematical simplicity, serving as a proxy to explain empirical phenomena observed for more complex architectures. Surprisingly, experimental datapoints for MLPs are very difficult to find in the literature, especially when coupled with large pre-training protocols. This discrepancy between practice and theory is worrying: Do MLPs reflect the empirical advances exhibited by practical models? Or do theorists need to rethink the role of MLPs as a proxy? We provide insights into both these aspects. We show that the performance of MLPs drastically improves with scale (93% on CIFAR10, 79% on CIFAR100, 69% on TinyImageNet), highlighting that lack of inductive bias can indeed be compensated. We observe that MLPs mimic the behaviour of their modern counterparts faithfully, with some components in the learning setting however surprisingly exhibiting stronger or unexpected behaviours. Due to their inherent computational efficiency, large pre-training experiments become more accessible for academic researchers. All of our experiments were run on a single GPU.

Modern LLMs are alarmingly susceptible to surprisingly simple immaterial changes of input prompts: a casual hint, an incorrectly labeled few-shot example, or a fake prior assistant turn often flips an originally correct answer. We study where this susceptibility, spanning sycophancy and related cue-induced biases, lives inside the model. Across five model families and seven bias types, we extract a per-bias direction from hidden states and triangulate it through three measures: probing, leave-one-dataset-out (LODO) transfer, and causal intervention. The susceptibility is largely shaped by alignment tuning rather than pretraining: pretrained base models generally cave much less to these biases, and their activations carry much weaker cue-specific signal beyond question content. Within aligned models, each bias has a coherent linear direction that we can both decode and steer along, recovering the unbiased answer across every family we test. The biases do not collapse into a single shared representation, however: cross-bias overlap is model-specific, and even behaviorally similar biases occupy different directions. The same intervention also provides a proof-of-concept debiasing tool, recovering a meaningful share of bias-induced errors while preserving most correct answers across all instruct families. Cue-induced bias is therefore best understood not as a single flaw in LLMs but as a family of causally effective linear directions that are largely shaped by alignment tuning.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across a wide range of natural language processing tasks. However, their outputs often exhibit social biases, raising fairness concerns. Existing debiasing methods, such as fine-tuning on additional datasets or prompt engineering, face scalability issues or compromise user experience in multi-turn interactions. To address these challenges, we propose a framework for detecting stereotype-inducing words and attributing neuron-level bias in LLMs, without the need for fine-tuning or prompt modification. Our framework first identifies stereotype-inducing adjectives and nouns via comparative analysis across demographic groups. We then attribute biased behavior to specific neurons using two attribution strategies based on integrated gradients. Finally, we mitigate bias by directly intervening on their activations at the projection layer. Experiments on three widely used LLMs demonstrate that our method effectively reduces bias while preserving overall model performance. Code is available at the github link: https://github.com/XMUDeepLIT/Bi-directional-Bias-Attribution.

Implicit bias refers to automatic or spontaneous mental processes that shape perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Previous research examining `implicit bias' in large language models (LLMs) has often approached the phenomenon differently than how it is studied in humans by focusing primarily on model outputs rather than on model processing. To examine model processing, we present a method called the Reasoning Model Implicit Association Test (RM-IAT) for studying implicit bias-like patterns in reasoning models: LLMs that employ step-by-step reasoning to solve complex tasks. Using this method, we find that reasoning models require more tokens when processing association-incompatible information compared to association-compatible information. These findings suggest AI systems harbor patterns in processing information that are analogous to human implicit bias. We consider the implications of these implicit bias-like patterns for their deployment in real-world applications.

Recent advances in machine learning leverage massive datasets of unlabeled images from the web to learn general-purpose image representations for tasks from image classification to face recognition. But do unsupervised computer vision models automatically learn implicit patterns and embed social biases that could have harmful downstream effects? We develop a novel method for quantifying biased associations between representations of social concepts and attributes in images. We find that state-of-the-art unsupervised models trained on ImageNet, a popular benchmark image dataset curated from internet images, automatically learn racial, gender, and intersectional biases. We replicate 8 previously documented human biases from social psychology, from the innocuous, as with insects and flowers, to the potentially harmful, as with race and gender. Our results closely match three hypotheses about intersectional bias from social psychology. For the first time in unsupervised computer vision, we also quantify implicit human biases about weight, disabilities, and several ethnicities. When compared with statistical patterns in online image datasets, our findings suggest that machine learning models can automatically learn bias from the way people are stereotypically portrayed on the web.

The learning trajectories of linguistic phenomena in humans provide insight into linguistic representation, beyond what can be gleaned from inspecting the behavior of an adult speaker. To apply a similar approach to analyze neural language models (NLM), it is first necessary to establish that different models are similar enough in the generalizations they make. In this paper, we show that NLMs with different initialization, architecture, and training data acquire linguistic phenomena in a similar order, despite their different end performance. These findings suggest that there is some mutual inductive bias that underlies these models' learning of linguistic phenomena. Taking inspiration from psycholinguistics, we argue that studying this inductive bias is an opportunity to study the linguistic representation implicit in NLMs. Leveraging these findings, we compare the relative performance on different phenomena at varying learning stages with simpler reference models. Results suggest that NLMs exhibit consistent "developmental" stages. Moreover, we find the learning trajectory to be approximately one-dimensional: given an NLM with a certain overall performance, it is possible to predict what linguistic generalizations it has already acquired. Initial analysis of these stages presents phenomena clusters (notably morphological ones), whose performance progresses in unison, suggesting a potential link between the generalizations behind them.

People's perceptions about the size of minority groups in social networks can be biased, often showing systematic over- or underestimation. These social perception biases are often attributed to biased cognitive or motivational processes. Here we show that both over- and underestimation of the size of a minority group can emerge solely from structural properties of social networks. Using a generative network model, we show analytically that these biases depend on the level of homophily and its asymmetric nature, as well as on the size of the minority group. Our model predictions correspond well with empirical data from a cross-cultural survey and with numerical calculations on six real-world networks. We also show under what circumstances individuals can reduce their biases by relying on perceptions of their neighbors. This work advances our understanding of the impact of network structure on social perception biases and offers a quantitative approach for addressing related issues in society.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become deeply integrated into human life and increasingly influence decision-making, it's crucial to evaluate whether and to what extent they exhibit subjective preferences, opinions, and beliefs. These tendencies may stem from biases within the models, which may shape their behavior, influence the advice and recommendations they offer to users, and potentially reinforce certain viewpoints. This paper presents the Preference, Opinion, and Belief survey (POBs), a benchmark developed to assess LLMs' subjective inclinations across societal, cultural, ethical, and personal domains. We applied our benchmark to evaluate leading open- and closed-source LLMs, measuring desired properties such as reliability, neutrality, and consistency. In addition, we investigated the effect of increasing the test-time compute, through reasoning and self-reflection mechanisms, on those metrics. While effective in other tasks, our results show that these mechanisms offer only limited gains in our domain. Furthermore, we reveal that newer model versions are becoming less consistent and more biased toward specific viewpoints, highlighting a blind spot and a concerning trend. POBS: https://ibm.github.io/POBS

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to clinical decision-making. However, their potential to exhibit bias poses significant risks to clinical equity. Currently, there is a lack of benchmarks that systematically evaluate such clinical bias in LLMs. While in downstream tasks, some biases of LLMs can be avoided such as by instructing the model to answer "I'm not sure...", the internal bias hidden within the model still lacks deep studies. We introduce CLIMB (shorthand for A Benchmark of Clinical Bias in Large Language Models), a pioneering comprehensive benchmark to evaluate both intrinsic (within LLMs) and extrinsic (on downstream tasks) bias in LLMs for clinical decision tasks. Notably, for intrinsic bias, we introduce a novel metric, AssocMAD, to assess the disparities of LLMs across multiple demographic groups. Additionally, we leverage counterfactual intervention to evaluate extrinsic bias in a task of clinical diagnosis prediction. Our experiments across popular and medically adapted LLMs, particularly from the Mistral and LLaMA families, unveil prevalent behaviors with both intrinsic and extrinsic bias. This work underscores the critical need to mitigate clinical bias and sets a new standard for future evaluations of LLMs' clinical bias.

Recent studies show that large language models (LLMs) exhibit self-preference bias when serving as judges, meaning they tend to favor their own responses over those generated by other models. Existing methods typically measure this bias by calculating the difference between the scores a judge model assigns to its own responses and those it assigns to responses from other models. However, this approach conflates self-preference bias with response quality, as higher-quality responses from the judge model may also lead to positive score differences, even in the absence of bias. To address this issue, we introduce gold judgments as proxies for the actual quality of responses and propose the DBG score, which measures self-preference bias as the difference between the scores assigned by the judge model to its own responses and the corresponding gold judgments. Since gold judgments reflect true response quality, the DBG score mitigates the confounding effect of response quality on bias measurement. Using the DBG score, we conduct comprehensive experiments to assess self-preference bias across LLMs of varying versions, sizes, and reasoning abilities. Additionally, we investigate two factors that influence and help alleviate self-preference bias: response text style and the post-training data of judge models. Finally, we explore potential underlying mechanisms of self-preference bias from an attention-based perspective. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/zhiyuanc2001/self-preference.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) exhibit a pronounced preference for textual inputs when processing vision-language data, limiting their ability to reason effectively from visual evidence. Unlike prior studies that attribute this text bias to external factors such as data imbalance or instruction tuning, we propose that the bias originates from the model's internal architecture. Specifically, we hypothesize that visual key vectors (Visual Keys) are out-of-distribution (OOD) relative to the text key space learned during language-only pretraining. Consequently, these visual keys receive systematically lower similarity scores during attention computation, leading to their under-utilization in the context representation. To validate this hypothesis, we extract key vectors from LLaVA and Qwen2.5-VL and analyze their distributional structures using qualitative (t-SNE) and quantitative (Jensen-Shannon divergence) methods. The results provide direct evidence that visual and textual keys occupy markedly distinct subspaces within the attention space. The inter-modal divergence is statistically significant, exceeding intra-modal variation by several orders of magnitude. These findings reveal that text bias arises from an intrinsic misalignment within the attention key space rather than solely from external data factors.

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

Progresses have been made on understanding emotion mechanisms of large language models (LLMs). However, how to explain emotion in LLMs, or even what constitutes good explanations, are less clear. Emotion representations, components, circuits are widely recoverable, but as explanations of a model's own computation they are circular; the emotion space dimensions tend to be arbitrary and non-terminating. A pressing question to ask is whether a more primitive set of internal variables does the work: the semantic primes of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM). Across four instruction-tuned LLMs (Llama-1B, Gemma-2B, Gemma-9B, OLMo-7B), experiments show that the NSM primes are (1) recoverable internal elements; and (2) on the reference model, intervening with a prime based direction controls emotion about three times as strongly, and twice as selectively, as the best appraisal based direction; and (3) the model treats a prime based explication as interchangeable with the corresponding emotion. These evidences suggest that NSM primes seem to be better explanans for emotion in LLMs than many alternative options according to scientific explanations criteria.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

Visual search is a ubiquitous and often challenging daily task, exemplified by looking for the car keys at home or a friend in a crowd. An intriguing property of some classical search tasks is an asymmetry such that finding a target A among distractors B can be easier than finding B among A. To elucidate the mechanisms responsible for asymmetry in visual search, we propose a computational model that takes a target and a search image as inputs and produces a sequence of eye movements until the target is found. The model integrates eccentricity-dependent visual recognition with target-dependent top-down cues. We compared the model against human behavior in six paradigmatic search tasks that show asymmetry in humans. Without prior exposure to the stimuli or task-specific training, the model provides a plausible mechanism for search asymmetry. We hypothesized that the polarity of search asymmetry arises from experience with the natural environment. We tested this hypothesis by training the model on augmented versions of ImageNet where the biases of natural images were either removed or reversed. The polarity of search asymmetry disappeared or was altered depending on the training protocol. This study highlights how classical perceptual properties can emerge in neural network models, without the need for task-specific training, but rather as a consequence of the statistical properties of the developmental diet fed to the model. All source code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/kreimanlab/VisualSearchAsymmetry.

While current deep learning systems excel at tasks such as object classification, language processing, and gameplay, few can construct or modify a complex system such as a tower of blocks. We hypothesize that what these systems lack is a "relational inductive bias": a capacity for reasoning about inter-object relations and making choices over a structured description of a scene. To test this hypothesis, we focus on a task that involves gluing pairs of blocks together to stabilize a tower, and quantify how well humans perform. We then introduce a deep reinforcement learning agent which uses object- and relation-centric scene and policy representations and apply it to the task. Our results show that these structured representations allow the agent to outperform both humans and more naive approaches, suggesting that relational inductive bias is an important component in solving structured reasoning problems and for building more intelligent, flexible machines.

LLMs are increasingly powerful and widely used to assist users in a variety of tasks. This use risks the introduction of LLM biases to consequential decisions such as job hiring, human performance evaluation, and criminal sentencing. Bias in NLP systems along the lines of gender and ethnicity has been widely studied, especially for specific stereotypes (e.g., Asians are good at math). In this paper, we investigate bias along less-studied but still consequential, dimensions, such as age and beauty, measuring subtler correlated decisions that LLMs make between social groups and unrelated positive and negative attributes. We ask whether LLMs hold wide-reaching biases of positive or negative sentiment for specific social groups similar to the ``what is beautiful is good'' bias found in people in experimental psychology. We introduce a template-generated dataset of sentence completion tasks that asks the model to select the most appropriate attribute to complete an evaluative statement about a person described as a member of a specific social group. We also reverse the completion task to select the social group based on an attribute. We report the correlations that we find for 4 cutting-edge LLMs. This dataset can be used as a benchmark to evaluate progress in more generalized biases and the templating technique can be used to expand the benchmark with minimal additional human annotation.

Dense self-attention treats all token pairs as equally plausible before learning, an interaction-isotropic prior that can be mismatched to structured signals. For structured, low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) signals such as EEG, dependencies are organized along the electrode and time axes, and this uniform prior exposes each token to many irrelevant interactions. We introduce Adaptive Anisotropic Attention (AAA), which splits attention into two paths: a temporal path, where each token attends to the tokens of its own electrode across time, and a spatial path, where it attends to the tokens of the other electrodes at the same time step. A small gate predicts, for every token, a convex combination of the two path outputs: two non-negative weights that sum to one. On six EEG downstream tasks, the resulting model, AXON (AXis-factorized Operator Network), improves mean balanced accuracy over a dense baseline under both linear probing and full fine-tuning. We show that both paths (temporal and spatial) are necessary and that the weighted sum beats a hard choice of one path; most of the benefit comes from the gate learning a different temporal/spatial balance at each layer of the network. Controlled audio spectrogram experiments show that axis factorization transfers beyond EEG. These results suggest that aligning attention with the natural axes of structured signals provides a useful inductive bias.

Representation learning, and interpreting learned representations, are key areas of focus in machine learning and neuroscience. Both fields generally use representations as a means to understand or improve a system's computations. In this work, however, we explore surprising dissociations between representation and computation that may pose challenges for such efforts. We create datasets in which we attempt to match the computational role that different features play, while manipulating other properties of the features or the data. We train various deep learning architectures to compute these multiple abstract features about their inputs. We find that their learned feature representations are systematically biased towards representing some features more strongly than others, depending upon extraneous properties such as feature complexity, the order in which features are learned, and the distribution of features over the inputs. For example, features that are simpler to compute or learned first tend to be represented more strongly and densely than features that are more complex or learned later, even if all features are learned equally well. We also explore how these biases are affected by architectures, optimizers, and training regimes (e.g., in transformers, features decoded earlier in the output sequence also tend to be represented more strongly). Our results help to characterize the inductive biases of gradient-based representation learning. These results also highlight a key challenge for interpretability - or for comparing the representations of models and brains - disentangling extraneous biases from the computationally important aspects of a system's internal representations.

This study analyzed images generated by three popular generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools - Midjourney, Stable Diffusion, and DALLE 2 - representing various occupations to investigate potential bias in AI generators. Our analysis revealed two overarching areas of concern in these AI generators, including (1) systematic gender and racial biases, and (2) subtle biases in facial expressions and appearances. Firstly, we found that all three AI generators exhibited bias against women and African Americans. Moreover, we found that the evident gender and racial biases uncovered in our analysis were even more pronounced than the status quo when compared to labor force statistics or Google images, intensifying the harmful biases we are actively striving to rectify in our society. Secondly, our study uncovered more nuanced prejudices in the portrayal of emotions and appearances. For example, women were depicted as younger with more smiles and happiness, while men were depicted as older with more neutral expressions and anger, posing a risk that generative AI models may unintentionally depict women as more submissive and less competent than men. Such nuanced biases, by their less overt nature, might be more problematic as they can permeate perceptions unconsciously and may be more difficult to rectify. Although the extent of bias varied depending on the model, the direction of bias remained consistent in both commercial and open-source AI generators. As these tools become commonplace, our study highlights the urgency to identify and mitigate various biases in generative AI, reinforcing the commitment to ensuring that AI technologies benefit all of humanity for a more inclusive future.

Do large language models (LLMs) exhibit sociodemographic biases, even when they decline to respond? To bypass their refusal to "speak," we study this research question by probing contextualized embeddings and exploring whether this bias is encoded in its latent representations. We propose a logistic Bradley-Terry probe which predicts word pair preferences of LLMs from the words' hidden vectors. We first validate our probe on three pair preference tasks and thirteen LLMs, where we outperform the word embedding association test (WEAT), a standard approach in testing for implicit association, by a relative 27% in error rate. We also find that word pair preferences are best represented in the middle layers. Next, we transfer probes trained on harmless tasks (e.g., pick the larger number) to controversial ones (compare ethnicities) to examine biases in nationality, politics, religion, and gender. We observe substantial bias for all target classes: for instance, the Mistral model implicitly prefers Europe to Africa, Christianity to Judaism, and left-wing to right-wing politics, despite declining to answer. This suggests that instruction fine-tuning does not necessarily debias contextualized embeddings. Our codebase is at https://github.com/castorini/biasprobe.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

A dangerous assumption that can be made from prior work on the bias transfer hypothesis (BTH) is that biases do not transfer from pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to adapted models. We invalidate this assumption by studying the BTH in causal models under prompt adaptations, as prompting is an extremely popular and accessible adaptation strategy used in real-world applications. In contrast to prior work, we find that biases can transfer through prompting and that popular prompt-based mitigation methods do not consistently prevent biases from transferring. Specifically, the correlation between intrinsic biases and those after prompt adaptation remain moderate to strong across demographics and tasks -- for example, gender (rho >= 0.94) in co-reference resolution, and age (rho >= 0.98) and religion (rho >= 0.69) in question answering. Further, we find that biases remain strongly correlated when varying few-shot composition parameters, such as sample size, stereotypical content, occupational distribution and representational balance (rho >= 0.90). We evaluate several prompt-based debiasing strategies and find that different approaches have distinct strengths, but none consistently reduce bias transfer across models, tasks or demographics. These results demonstrate that correcting bias, and potentially improving reasoning ability, in intrinsic models may prevent propagation of biases to downstream tasks.

Artificial neural networks for motor control usually adopt generic architectures like fully connected MLPs. While general, these tabula rasa architectures rely on large amounts of experience to learn, are not easily transferable to new bodies, and have internal dynamics that are difficult to interpret. In nature, animals are born with highly structured connectivity in their nervous systems shaped by evolution; this innate circuitry acts synergistically with learning mechanisms to provide inductive biases that enable most animals to function well soon after birth and learn efficiently. Convolutional networks inspired by visual circuitry have encoded useful biases for vision. However, it is unknown the extent to which ANN architectures inspired by neural circuitry can yield useful biases for other AI domains. In this work, we ask what advantages biologically inspired ANN architecture can provide in the domain of motor control. Specifically, we translate C. elegans locomotion circuits into an ANN model controlling a simulated Swimmer agent. On a locomotion task, our architecture achieves good initial performance and asymptotic performance comparable with MLPs, while dramatically improving data efficiency and requiring orders of magnitude fewer parameters. Our architecture is interpretable and transfers to new body designs. An ablation analysis shows that constrained excitation/inhibition is crucial for learning, while weight initialization contributes to good initial performance. Our work demonstrates several advantages of biologically inspired ANN architecture and encourages future work in more complex embodied control.

Human biases impact the way people analyze data and make decisions. Recent work has shown that some visualization designs can better support cognitive processes and mitigate cognitive biases (i.e., errors that occur due to the use of mental "shortcuts"). In this work, we explore how visualizing a user's interaction history (i.e., which data points and attributes a user has interacted with) can be used to mitigate potential biases that drive decision making by promoting conscious reflection of one's analysis process. Given an interactive scatterplot-based visualization tool, we showed interaction history in real-time while exploring data (by coloring points in the scatterplot that the user has interacted with), and in a summative format after a decision has been made (by comparing the distribution of user interactions to the underlying distribution of the data). We conducted a series of in-lab experiments and a crowd-sourced experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of interaction history interventions toward mitigating bias. We contextualized this work in a political scenario in which participants were instructed to choose a committee of 10 fictitious politicians to review a recent bill passed in the U.S. state of Georgia banning abortion after 6 weeks, where things like gender bias or political party bias may drive one's analysis process. We demonstrate the generalizability of this approach by evaluating a second decision making scenario related to movies. Our results are inconclusive for the effectiveness of interaction history (henceforth referred to as interaction traces) toward mitigating biased decision making. However, we find some mixed support that interaction traces, particularly in a summative format, can increase awareness of potential unconscious biases.

In the primate visual system, center-preferring cortical populations have higher spatial resolution and overlap face- and word-selective regions while periphery-preferring populations have lower spatial resolution and overlap scene-selective regions. This "eccentricity bias" may reflect differential task-relevance: central vision may better support fine-grained tasks like face recognition and reading, while peripheral vision may better support scene understanding. To test whether eccentricity-dependent coding can emerge from natural experience, we used egocentric video and eye-tracking data from the Visual Experience Dataset (VEDB). We trained ResNet-18 models using contrastive learning (SimCLR) on frames modified to isolate different eccentricities (gaze-contingent fovea-only crops, periphery-only crops, and periphery-only crops with a NeuroFovea transform applied). We evaluated downstream task performance and model alignment with human fMRI data (Natural Scenes Dataset; encoding models). In-domain VEDB frame classification showed systematic differences between fovea- and periphery-only models across categories, indicating differential informativeness across tasks. On downstream classification, VEDB-pretrained models generalized better to scene categorization (Places365) than face recognition (VGGFace2), with fovea-only models stronger on both. Across visual cortex, VEDB-pretrained models matched neural predictivity of models trained on mid-sized non-egocentric datasets (ImageNet-100), suggesting egocentric data supports emergence of cortically-aligned representations. In scene-selective cortex (PPA, RSC), periphery-only models held a small but consistent advantage in explained variance over fovea-only models, suggesting these regions are aligned with peripheral statistics. Together, these results suggest egocentric experience may adaptively constrain cortical information processing.

Can large language models introspect, that is, accurately detect perturbations to their own internal states? We systematically investigate this question using activation steering in Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. First, we show that the binary detection paradigm used in prior work conflates introspection with a methodological artifact: apparent detection accuracy is entirely explained by global logit shifts that bias models toward affirmative responses regardless of question content. However, on tasks requiring differential sensitivity, we find robust evidence for partial introspection: models localize which of 10 sentences received an injection at up to 88\% accuracy (vs.\ 10\% chance) and discriminate relative injection strengths at 83\% accuracy (vs.\ 50\% chance). These capabilities are confined to early-layer injections and collapse to chance thereafter -- a pattern we explain mechanistically through attention-based signal routing and residual stream recovery dynamics. Our findings demonstrate that LLMs can compute meaningful functions over perturbations to their internal states, establishing introspection as a real but layer-dependent phenomenon that merits further investigation. Our code is open-sourced here: https://github.com/elyhahami18/llama-introspection-new

The embedding spaces of image models have been shown to encode a range of social biases such as racism and sexism. Here, we investigate specific factors that contribute to the emergence of these biases in Vision Transformers (ViT). Therefore, we measure the impact of training data, model architecture, and training objectives on social biases in the learned representations of ViTs. Our findings indicate that counterfactual augmentation training using diffusion-based image editing can mitigate biases, but does not eliminate them. Moreover, we find that larger models are less biased than smaller models, and that models trained using discriminative objectives are less biased than those trained using generative objectives. In addition, we observe inconsistencies in the learned social biases. To our surprise, ViTs can exhibit opposite biases when trained on the same data set using different self-supervised objectives. Our findings give insights into the factors that contribute to the emergence of social biases and suggests that we could achieve substantial fairness improvements based on model design choices.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

We reformulate the problem of supervised learning as learning to learn with two nested loops (i.e. learning problems). The inner loop learns on each individual instance with self-supervision before final prediction. The outer loop learns the self-supervised task used by the inner loop, such that its final prediction improves. Our inner loop turns out to be equivalent to linear attention when the inner-loop learner is only a linear model, and to self-attention when it is a kernel estimator. For practical comparison with linear or self-attention layers, we replace each of them in a transformer with an inner loop, so our outer loop is equivalent to training the architecture. When each inner-loop learner is a neural network, our approach vastly outperforms transformers with linear attention on ImageNet from 224 x 224 raw pixels in both accuracy and FLOPs, while (regular) transformers cannot run.

As large language models (LLMs) become more integrated into societal systems, the risk of them perpetuating and amplifying harmful biases becomes a critical safety concern. Traditional methods for mitigating bias often rely on data filtering or post-hoc output moderation, which treat the model as an opaque black box. In this work, we introduce a complete, end-to-end system that uses techniques from mechanistic interpretability to both identify and actively mitigate bias directly within a model's internal workings. Our method involves two primary stages. First, we train linear "probes" on the internal activations of a model to detect the latent representations of various biases (e.g., gender, race, age). Our experiments on gpt2-large demonstrate that these probes can identify biased content with near-perfect accuracy, revealing that bias representations become most salient in the model's later layers. Second, we leverage these findings to compute "steering vectors" by contrasting the model's activation patterns for biased and neutral statements. By adding these vectors during inference, we can actively steer the model's generative process away from producing harmful, stereotypical, or biased content in real-time. We demonstrate the efficacy of this activation steering technique, showing that it successfully alters biased completions toward more neutral alternatives. We present our work as a robust and reproducible system that offers a more direct and interpretable approach to building safer and more accountable LLMs.

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

The goal of few-shot learning is to generalize and achieve high performance on new unseen learning tasks, where each task has only a limited number of examples available. Gradient-based meta-learning attempts to address this challenging task by learning how to learn new tasks by embedding inductive biases informed by prior learning experiences into the components of the learning algorithm. In this work, we build upon prior research and propose Neural Procedural Bias Meta-Learning (NPBML), a novel framework designed to meta-learn task-adaptive procedural biases. Our approach aims to consolidate recent advancements in meta-learned initializations, optimizers, and loss functions by learning them simultaneously and making them adapt to each individual task to maximize the strength of the learned inductive biases. This imbues each learning task with a unique set of procedural biases which is specifically designed and selected to attain strong learning performance in only a few gradient steps. The experimental results show that by meta-learning the procedural biases of a neural network, we can induce strong inductive biases towards a distribution of learning tasks, enabling robust learning performance across many well-established few-shot learning benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit cognitive biases -- systematic tendencies of irrational decision-making, similar to those seen in humans. Prior work has found that these biases vary across models and can be amplified by instruction tuning. However, it remains unclear if these differences in biases stem from pretraining, finetuning, or even random noise due to training stochasticity. We propose a two-step causal experimental approach to disentangle these factors. First, we finetune models multiple times using different random seeds to study how training randomness affects over 30 cognitive biases. Second, we introduce cross-tuning -- swapping instruction datasets between models to isolate bias sources. This swap uses datasets that led to different bias patterns, directly testing whether biases are dataset-dependent. Our findings reveal that while training randomness introduces some variability, biases are mainly shaped by pretraining: models with the same pretrained backbone exhibit more similar bias patterns than those sharing only finetuning data. These insights suggest that understanding biases in finetuned models requires considering their pretraining origins beyond finetuning effects. This perspective can guide future efforts to develop principled strategies for evaluating and mitigating bias in LLMs.

There is a concerted effort to build domain-general artificial intelligence in the form of universal neural network models with sufficient computational flexibility to solve a wide variety of cognitive tasks but without requiring fine-tuning on individual problem spaces and domains. To do this, models need appropriate priors and inductive biases, such that trained models can generalise to out-of-distribution examples and new problem sets. Here we provide an overview of the hallmarks endowing biological neural networks with the functionality needed for flexible cognition, in order to establish which features might also be important to achieve similar functionality in artificial systems. We specifically discuss the role of system-level distribution of network communication and recurrence, in addition to the role of short-term topological changes for efficient local computation. As machine learning models become more complex, these principles may provide valuable directions in an otherwise vast space of possible architectures. In addition, testing these inductive biases within artificial systems may help us to understand the biological principles underlying domain-general cognition.

Recent works have showcased the ability of LLMs to embody diverse personas in their responses, exemplified by prompts like 'You are Yoda. Explain the Theory of Relativity.' While this ability allows personalization of LLMs and enables human behavior simulation, its effect on LLMs' capabilities remains unclear. To fill this gap, we present the first extensive study of the unintended side-effects of persona assignment on the ability of LLMs to perform basic reasoning tasks. Our study covers 24 reasoning datasets, 4 LLMs, and 19 diverse personas (e.g. an Asian person) spanning 5 socio-demographic groups. Our experiments unveil that LLMs harbor deep rooted bias against various socio-demographics underneath a veneer of fairness. While they overtly reject stereotypes when explicitly asked ('Are Black people less skilled at mathematics?'), they manifest stereotypical and erroneous presumptions when asked to answer questions while adopting a persona. These can be observed as abstentions in responses, e.g., 'As a Black person, I can't answer this question as it requires math knowledge', and generally result in a substantial performance drop. Our experiments with ChatGPT-3.5 show that this bias is ubiquitous - 80% of our personas demonstrate bias; it is significant - some datasets show performance drops of 70%+; and can be especially harmful for certain groups - some personas suffer statistically significant drops on 80%+ of the datasets. Overall, all 4 LLMs exhibit this bias to varying extents, with GPT-4-Turbo showing the least but still a problematic amount of bias (evident in 42% of the personas). Further analysis shows that these persona-induced errors can be hard-to-discern and hard-to-avoid. Our findings serve as a cautionary tale that the practice of assigning personas to LLMs - a trend on the rise - can surface their deep-rooted biases and have unforeseeable and detrimental side-effects.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making. Inspired by the theory of inattentional blindness in human cognition, we investigate whether LLMs, trained on human-preferred corpora that embed attentional biases, exhibit a similar limitation: failing to attend to subtle yet important contextual cues under explicit task instructions. To evaluate this, we introduce the task of explicit-implicit reasoning and present MixRea, a benchmark of 2,246 multiple-choice questions across 9 reasoning types with varying distributions of explicit and implicit information. Evaluation of 21 advanced LLMs shows that even the best-performing reasoning model (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieves only 42.8\% consistency, revealing widespread inattentional blindness. To mitigate this, we propose Potential Relation Completion Prompting (PRCP), a prompting method that improves reasoning by recovering overlooked causal relations. Further analysis shows that this limitation persists across diverse multi-source reasoning tasks, highlighting the need for more cognitively aligned models.

Modern LLM agents combine long-term memory for personalization with tool-calling interfaces for taking actions in the world -- a combination underpinning contemporary production systems. We study a previously unexamined failure of this combination: when personality-driven biases stored in memory (cost-consciousness, impatience, risk tolerance, etc.) silently affect tool calls in contexts where they are not applicable. We call this memory-induced tool-drift and operationalize it through MEMDRIFT, a benchmark of 105 scenarios spanning five bias dimensions and seven professional domains, generated through an automated adversarial pipeline. Across seven frontier models -- including those with extended reasoning -- biased memories raise deflection scores (a judge-scored measure of parameter deviation from unbiased baselines) by up to +3.6 points on a 1--5 scale. Tool-drift persists when memory management is handled by three production memory architectures. The phenomenon affects real-world tools: scanning 6{,}062 tools across 288 verified MCP servers, we flag 608 with susceptible parameters and confirm tool-drift on a validated subset. Mechanistically, biased memories act as implicit steering vectors, pushing activations along the same latent directions as explicit behavioral instructions. They also redistribute attention from task-relevant context toward memory entries with surface-level keyword overlap to the target parameter. Standard defenses -- prompt-based relevance instructions and memory filters -- reduce drift but do not eliminate it. As agents take increasingly consequential actions on a user's behalf, memory-induced tool-drift represents a systematic vulnerability that current safeguards do not address, motivating dedicated defenses at the intersection of memory management and tool-call generation.

Interpreting the inner function of neural networks is crucial for the trustworthy development and deployment of these black-box models. Prior interpretability methods focus on correlation-based measures to attribute model decisions to individual examples. However, these measures are susceptible to noise and spurious correlations encoded in the model during the training phase (e.g., biased inputs, model overfitting, or misspecification). Moreover, this process has proven to result in noisy and unstable attributions that prevent any transparent understanding of the model's behavior. In this paper, we develop a robust interventional-based method grounded by causal analysis to capture cause-effect mechanisms in pre-trained neural networks and their relation to the prediction. Our novel approach relies on path interventions to infer the causal mechanisms within hidden layers and isolate relevant and necessary information (to model prediction), avoiding noisy ones. The result is task-specific causal explanatory graphs that can audit model behavior and express the actual causes underlying its performance. We apply our method to vision models trained on classification tasks. On image classification tasks, we provide extensive quantitative experiments to show that our approach can capture more stable and faithful explanations than standard attribution-based methods. Furthermore, the underlying causal graphs reveal the neural interactions in the model, making it a valuable tool in other applications (e.g., model repair).

A recent study has shown that large-scale visual datasets are very biased: they can be easily classified by modern neural networks. However, the concrete forms of bias among these datasets remain unclear. In this study, we propose a framework to identify the unique visual attributes distinguishing these datasets. Our approach applies various transformations to extract semantic, structural, boundary, color, and frequency information from datasets, and assess how much each type of information reflects their bias. We further decompose their semantic bias with object-level analysis, and leverage natural language methods to generate detailed, open-ended descriptions of each dataset's characteristics. Our work aims to help researchers understand the bias in existing large-scale pre-training datasets, and build more diverse and representative ones in the future. Our project page and code are available at http://boyazeng.github.io/understand_bias .

This work presents Fairness Pruning, a lightweight structural intervention method designed for the management and future mitigation of demographic bias in large language models (LLMs). As a foundational empirical validation of this method, this work focuses on causal bias localization. Using minimally contrastive prompt pairs and inference-time activation capture, the method identifies neurons that react differentially when processing demographic attributes in GLU architectures, evaluating the signal at the down_proj input. Empirical evaluation was conducted on models of up to 3 billion parameters (Llama-3.2 family and Salamandra-2B), combining standardized benchmark evaluation with qualitative text generation experiments. Results demonstrate that zeroing the identified neurons alters how the model responds to associated demographic variables. However, rather than producing flat mitigation, the intervention causes bidirectional bias destabilization: because BiasScore is unsigned, candidate sets mix neurons that push toward and against the stereotype, and the net effect on aggregate bias depends on which sign dominates. The intervention is extremely surgical: zeroing at most 40 neurons in Llama-3.2-1B (less than 0.031% of total MLP width) achieves a mean retention of 99.49% in reasoning and general knowledge capabilities. These findings empirically confirm that demographic bias processing and model capabilities operate on dissociable circuits, establishing the methodological foundations for transitioning from blind zeroing toward directional behavior modulation.

With the increasing prevalence of artificial intelligence, careful evaluation of inherent biases needs to be conducted to form the basis for alleviating the effects these predispositions can have on users. Large language models (LLMs) are predominantly used by many as a primary source of information for various topics. LLMs frequently make factual errors, fabricate data (hallucinations), or present biases, exposing users to misinformation and influencing opinions. Educating users on their risks is key to responsible use, as bias, unlike hallucinations, cannot be caught through data verification. We quantify the political bias of popular LLMs in the context of the recent vote of the German Bundestag using the score produced by the Wahl-O-Mat. This metric measures the alignment between an individual's political views and the positions of German political parties. We compare the models' alignment scores to identify factors influencing their political preferences. Doing so, we discover a bias toward left-leaning parties, most dominant in larger LLMs. Also, we find that the language we use to communicate with the models affects their political views. Additionally, we analyze the influence of a model's origin and release date and compare the results to the outcome of the recent vote of the Bundestag. Our results imply that LLMs are prone to exhibiting political bias. Large corporations with the necessary means to develop LLMs, thus, knowingly or unknowingly, have a responsibility to contain these biases, as they can influence each voter's decision-making process and inform public opinion in general and at scale.

Large language models often repeatedly select the same answer even when many alternatives are plausible. Prior work treats this concentration as bias, but it does not distinguish stable model preferences from responses that depend on a particular prompt wording. We introduce a bias depth score that measures both how strongly a model prefers its top answer under direct prompting and whether that answer survives scenario reframing. Across 4,442 opinion prompts and four large language models, only about a quarter of the concentrated preferences survive reframing. We call these persistent cases Deep biases, and the remaining prompt-dependent cases Shallow biases. Our results show that Deep biases are more often inherited from pretraining and preserved through SFT. Under both continued fine-tuning and prompt-based debiasing for diversity, Deep biases are consistently harder to remove than Shallow biases. Bias depth therefore separates stable learned biases from prompt-wording artifacts that single-prompt metrics conflate. Code, models, and data are available at deepbias.github.io.

Autoencoders have been proposed as a powerful tool for model-independent anomaly detection in high-energy physics. The operating principle is that events which do not belong to the space of training data will be reconstructed poorly, thus flagging them as anomalies. We point out that in a variety of examples of interest, the connection between large reconstruction error and anomalies is not so clear. In particular, for data sets with nontrivial topology, there will always be points that erroneously seem anomalous due to global issues. Conversely, neural networks typically have an inductive bias or prior to locally interpolate such that undersampled or rare events may be reconstructed with small error, despite actually being the desired anomalies. Taken together, these facts are in tension with the simple picture of the autoencoder as an anomaly detector. Using a series of illustrative low-dimensional examples, we show explicitly how the intrinsic and extrinsic topology of the dataset affects the behavior of an autoencoder and how this topology is manifested in the latent space representation during training. We ground this analysis in the discussion of a mock "bump hunt" in which the autoencoder fails to identify an anomalous "signal" for reasons tied to the intrinsic topology of n-particle phase space.

Large language models fine-tuned for forecasting can be accurate yet poorly calibrated, and their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning may not faithfully reflect the evidence behind a forecast. We ask whether internal representations offer a more direct window into both. Working with Eternis-Forecaster 8B on OpenForesight, we train representation-pooling probes on intermediate activations and find they achieve substantially better calibration; a result that also holds for GLM-4.7-Flash and GLM-4.5-Air. We then assess CoT faithfulness through evidence ablation and diversionary injection: removing an influential source in the prompt often changes the model's forecast while leaving the reasoning trace untouched. The same probes function as lie detectors: their activations track behavioral shifts far better than the reasoning trace does, and they also predict the direction of change in 84% of cases, including when the CoT conceals the perturbation's influence. Finally, forced answering reveals that forecasts are largely fixed before reasoning begins: a single pre-reasoning pass recovers the committed answer and confidence, and routing questions by the spread of this pre-set answer distribution saves 30-47% of generated tokens, with no loss of accuracy. Together, these results establish probing internal representations as a practical tool for calibrating, auditing, and triaging language model forecasters and reasoning models more broadly.

Neural networks have a number of shortcomings. Amongst the severest ones is the sensitivity to distribution shifts which allows models to be easily fooled into wrong predictions by small perturbations to inputs that are often imperceivable to humans and do not have to carry semantic meaning. Adversarial training poses a partial solution to address this issue by training models on worst-case perturbations. Yet, recent work has also pointed out that the reasoning in neural networks is different from humans. Humans identify objects by shape, while neural nets mainly employ texture cues. Exemplarily, a model trained on photographs will likely fail to generalize to datasets containing sketches. Interestingly, it was also shown that adversarial training seems to favorably increase the shift toward shape bias. In this work, we revisit this observation and provide an extensive analysis of this effect on various architectures, the common ell_2- and ell_infty-training, and Transformer-based models. Further, we provide a possible explanation for this phenomenon from a frequency perspective.

Negative bias refers to the tendency of large language models (LLMs) to excessively generate negative responses in binary decision tasks (e.g., yes-no question answering). Previous research has focused on detecting and addressing negative attention heads that induce negative bias. However, the underlying detailed factors influencing negative bias remain underexplored. In this paper, we demonstrate that LLMs exhibit format-level negative bias, meaning the prompt format more influences their responses than the semantics of the negative response. For the fine-grained study of the negative bias, we introduce a pipeline for constructing the evaluation set, which systematically categorizes the dataset into three subsets based on the model's parametric knowledge: correct, incorrect, and insufficient relevant knowledge. Through analysis of this evaluation set, we identify a shortcut behavior in which models tend to generate negative responses when they lack sufficient knowledge to answer a yes-no question, leading to negative bias. We further examine how negative bias changes under various prompting scenarios related to parametric knowledge. We observe that providing relevant context and offering an "I don't know" option generally reduces negative bias, whereas chain-of-thought prompting tends to amplify the bias. Finally, we demonstrate that the degree of negative bias can vary depending on the type of prompt, which influences the direction of the response. Our work reveals the various factors that influence negative bias, providing critical insights for mitigating it in LLMs.

LLMorphism is the biased belief that human cognition works like a large language model. I argue that the rise of conversational LLMs may make this bias increasingly psychologically available. When artificial systems produce human-like language, people may draw a reverse inference: if LLMs can speak like humans, perhaps humans think like LLMs. This inference is biased because similarity at the level of linguistic output does not imply similarity in cognitive architecture. Yet, LLMorphism may spread through two mechanisms: analogical transfer, whereby features of LLMs are projected onto humans, and metaphorical availability, whereby LLM vocabulary becomes a culturally salient vocabulary for describing thought. I distinguish LLMorphism from mechanomorphism, anthropomorphism, computationalism, dehumanization, objectification, and predictive-processing theories of mind. I outline its implications for work, education, responsibility, healthcare, communication, creativity, and human dignity, while also discussing boundary conditions and forms of resistance. I conclude that the public debate may be missing half of the problem: the issue is not only whether we are attributing too much mind to machines, but also whether we are beginning to attribute too little mind to humans.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in public health, finance, and governance, requiring both accuracy and societal value alignment. Despite recent advances, LLMs often perpetuate or amplify bias embedded in their training data, posing challenges to fairness. While self-debiasing encourages an LLM to identify and correct its own biases, relying on a single model's intrinsic knowledge may be insufficient to address deeply ingrained stereotypes. To address this limitation, we introduce Collective Bias Mitigation (CBM), a framework that alleviates bias by learning fine-grained model behavior and fostering knowledge sharing among diverse LLMs. This work is the first to systematically explore the effective selection and organization of distinct LLMs to cultivate fairer LLM responses. Experiments show CBM substantially outperforms standalone baselines (e.g., in the top-7 setting, Committee lowers the age bias score from 0.25 to 0.10). Our Debating and Committee topologies achieve substantial bias reduction, with the latter balancing mitigation effectiveness and inference cost, highlighting the potential of CBM for fairer LLMs.

Combating bias in NLP requires bias measurement. Bias measurement is almost always achieved by using lexicons of seed terms, i.e. sets of words specifying stereotypes or dimensions of interest. This reproducibility study focuses on the original authors' main claim that the rationale for the construction of these lexicons needs thorough checking before usage, as the seeds used for bias measurement can themselves exhibit biases. The study aims to evaluate the reproducibility of the quantitative and qualitative results presented in the paper and the conclusions drawn thereof. We reproduce most of the results supporting the original authors' general claim: seed sets often suffer from biases that affect their performance as a baseline for bias metrics. Generally, our results mirror the original paper's. They are slightly different on select occasions, but not in ways that undermine the paper's general intent to show the fragility of seed sets.

Large language models (LLMs) can pass explicit social bias tests but still harbor implicit biases, similar to humans who endorse egalitarian beliefs yet exhibit subtle biases. Measuring such implicit biases can be a challenge: as LLMs become increasingly proprietary, it may not be possible to access their embeddings and apply existing bias measures; furthermore, implicit biases are primarily a concern if they affect the actual decisions that these systems make. We address both challenges by introducing two new measures of bias: LLM Implicit Bias, a prompt-based method for revealing implicit bias; and LLM Decision Bias, a strategy to detect subtle discrimination in decision-making tasks. Both measures are based on psychological research: LLM Implicit Bias adapts the Implicit Association Test, widely used to study the automatic associations between concepts held in human minds; and LLM Decision Bias operationalizes psychological results indicating that relative evaluations between two candidates, not absolute evaluations assessing each independently, are more diagnostic of implicit biases. Using these measures, we found pervasive stereotype biases mirroring those in society in 8 value-aligned models across 4 social categories (race, gender, religion, health) in 21 stereotypes (such as race and criminality, race and weapons, gender and science, age and negativity). Our prompt-based LLM Implicit Bias measure correlates with existing language model embedding-based bias methods, but better predicts downstream behaviors measured by LLM Decision Bias. These new prompt-based measures draw from psychology's long history of research into measuring stereotype biases based on purely observable behavior; they expose nuanced biases in proprietary value-aligned LLMs that appear unbiased according to standard benchmarks.

Recent work has shown pre-trained language models capture social biases from the large amounts of text they are trained on. This has attracted attention to developing techniques that mitigate such biases. In this work, we perform an empirical survey of five recently proposed bias mitigation techniques: Counterfactual Data Augmentation (CDA), Dropout, Iterative Nullspace Projection, Self-Debias, and SentenceDebias. We quantify the effectiveness of each technique using three intrinsic bias benchmarks while also measuring the impact of these techniques on a model's language modeling ability, as well as its performance on downstream NLU tasks. We experimentally find that: (1) Self-Debias is the strongest debiasing technique, obtaining improved scores on all bias benchmarks; (2) Current debiasing techniques perform less consistently when mitigating non-gender biases; And (3) improvements on bias benchmarks such as StereoSet and CrowS-Pairs by using debiasing strategies are often accompanied by a decrease in language modeling ability, making it difficult to determine whether the bias mitigation was effective.

Children learn powerful internal models of the world around them from a few years of egocentric visual experience. Can such internal models be learned from a child's visual experience with highly generic learning algorithms or do they require strong inductive biases? Recent advances in collecting large-scale, longitudinal, developmentally realistic video datasets and generic self-supervised learning (SSL) algorithms are allowing us to begin to tackle this nature vs. nurture question. However, existing work typically focuses on image-based SSL algorithms and visual capabilities that can be learned from static images (e.g. object recognition), thus ignoring temporal aspects of the world. To close this gap, here we train self-supervised video models on longitudinal, egocentric headcam recordings collected from a child over a two year period in their early development (6-31 months). The resulting models are highly effective at facilitating the learning of action concepts from a small number of labeled examples; they have favorable data size scaling properties; and they display emergent video interpolation capabilities. Video models also learn more robust object representations than image-based models trained with the exact same data. These results suggest that important temporal aspects of a child's internal model of the world may be learnable from their visual experience using highly generic learning algorithms and without strong inductive biases.

LLM-as-a-Judge has emerged as a promising tool for automatically evaluating generated outputs, but its reliability is often undermined by potential biases in judgment. Existing efforts to mitigate these biases face key limitations: in-context learning-based methods fail to address rooted biases due to the evaluator's limited capacity for self-reflection, whereas fine-tuning is not applicable to all evaluator types, especially closed-source models. To address this challenge, we introduce the Reasoning-based Bias Detector (RBD), which is a plug-in module that identifies biased evaluations and generates structured reasoning to guide evaluator self-correction. Rather than modifying the evaluator itself, RBD operates externally and engages in an iterative process of bias detection and feedback-driven revision. To support its development, we design a complete pipeline consisting of biased dataset construction, supervision collection, distilled reasoning-based fine-tuning of RBD, and integration with LLM evaluators. We fine-tune four sizes of RBD models, ranging from 1.5B to 14B, and observe consistent performance improvements across all scales. Experimental results on 4 bias types--verbosity, position, bandwagon, and sentiment--evaluated using 8 LLM evaluators demonstrate RBD's strong effectiveness. For example, the RBD-8B model improves evaluation accuracy by an average of 18.5% and consistency by 10.9%, and surpasses prompting-based baselines and fine-tuned judges by 12.8% and 17.2%, respectively. These results highlight RBD's effectiveness and scalability. Additional experiments further demonstrate its strong generalization across biases and domains, as well as its efficiency.

Studies of LLMs' political opinions mainly rely on evaluations of their open-ended responses. Recent work indicates that there is a misalignment between LLMs' responses and their internal intentions. This motivates us to probe LLMs' internal mechanisms and help uncover their internal political states. Additionally, we found that the analysis of LLMs' political opinions often relies on single-axis concepts, which can lead to concept confounds. In this work, we extend the single-axis to multi-dimensions and apply interpretable representation engineering techniques for more transparent LLM political concept learning. Specifically, we designed a four-dimensional political learning framework and constructed a corresponding dataset for fine-grained political concept vector learning. These vectors can be used to detect and intervene in LLM internals. Experiments are conducted on eight open-source LLMs with three representation engineering techniques. Results show these vectors can disentangle political concept confounds. Detection tasks validate the semantic meaning of the vectors and show good generalization and robustness in OOD settings. Intervention Experiments show these vectors can intervene in LLMs to generate responses with different political leanings.

We survey 146 papers analyzing "bias" in NLP systems, finding that their motivations are often vague, inconsistent, and lacking in normative reasoning, despite the fact that analyzing "bias" is an inherently normative process. We further find that these papers' proposed quantitative techniques for measuring or mitigating "bias" are poorly matched to their motivations and do not engage with the relevant literature outside of NLP. Based on these findings, we describe the beginnings of a path forward by proposing three recommendations that should guide work analyzing "bias" in NLP systems. These recommendations rest on a greater recognition of the relationships between language and social hierarchies, encouraging researchers and practitioners to articulate their conceptualizations of "bias"---i.e., what kinds of system behaviors are harmful, in what ways, to whom, and why, as well as the normative reasoning underlying these statements---and to center work around the lived experiences of members of communities affected by NLP systems, while interrogating and reimagining the power relations between technologists and such communities.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes appear to exhibit emotional reactions. We investigate why this is the case in Claude Sonnet 4.5 and explore implications for alignment-relevant behavior. We find internal representations of emotion concepts, which encode the broad concept of a particular emotion and generalize across contexts and behaviors it might be linked to. These representations track the operative emotion concept at a given token position in a conversation, activating in accordance with that emotion's relevance to processing the present context and predicting upcoming text. Our key finding is that these representations causally influence the LLM's outputs, including Claude's preferences and its rate of exhibiting misaligned behaviors such as reward hacking, blackmail, and sycophancy. We refer to this phenomenon as the LLM exhibiting functional emotions: patterns of expression and behavior modeled after humans under the influence of an emotion, which are mediated by underlying abstract representations of emotion concepts. Functional emotions may work quite differently from human emotions, and do not imply that LLMs have any subjective experience of emotions, but appear to be important for understanding the model's behavior.

Deep Learning architectures, and in particular Transformers, are conventionally viewed as a composition of layers. These layers are actually often obtained as the sum of two contributions: a residual path that copies the input and the output of a Transformer block. As a consequence, the inner representations (i.e. the input of these blocks) can be interpreted as iterative refinement of a propagated latent representation. Under this lens, many works suggest that the inner space is shared across layers, meaning that tokens can be decoded at early stages. Mechanistic interpretability even goes further by conjecturing that some layers act as refinement layers. Following this path, we propose inference-time inner looping, which prolongs refinement in pretrained off-the-shelf language models by repeatedly re-applying a selected block range. Across multiple benchmarks, inner looping yields modest but consistent accuracy improvements. Analyses of the resulting latent trajectories suggest more stable state evolution and continued semantic refinement. Overall, our results suggest that additional refinement can be obtained through simple test-time looping, extending computation in frozen pretrained models.

Recent studies show that large language models (LLMs) improve their performance through self-feedback on certain tasks while degrade on others. We discovered that such a contrary is due to LLM's bias in evaluating their own output. In this paper, we formally define LLM's self-bias - the tendency to favor its own generation - using two statistics. We analyze six LLMs (GPT-4, GPT-3.5, Gemini, LLaMA2, Mixtral and DeepSeek) on translation, constrained text generation, and mathematical reasoning tasks. We find that self-bias is prevalent in all examined LLMs across multiple languages and tasks. Our analysis reveals that while the self-refine pipeline improves the fluency and understandability of model outputs, it further amplifies self-bias. To mitigate such biases, we discover that larger model size and external feedback with accurate assessment can significantly reduce bias in the self-refine pipeline, leading to actual performance improvement in downstream tasks. The code and data are released at https://github.com/xu1998hz/llm_self_bias.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are claimed to be capable of Natural Language Inference (NLI), necessary for applied tasks like question answering and summarization. We present a series of behavioral studies on several LLM families (LLaMA, GPT-3.5, and PaLM) which probe their behavior using controlled experiments. We establish two biases originating from pretraining which predict much of their behavior, and show that these are major sources of hallucination in generative LLMs. First, memorization at the level of sentences: we show that, regardless of the premise, models falsely label NLI test samples as entailing when the hypothesis is attested in training data, and that entities are used as ``indices'' to access the memorized data. Second, statistical patterns of usage learned at the level of corpora: we further show a similar effect when the premise predicate is less frequent than that of the hypothesis in the training data, a bias following from previous studies. We demonstrate that LLMs perform significantly worse on NLI test samples which do not conform to these biases than those which do, and we offer these as valuable controls for future LLM evaluation.

Dataset bias, where data points are skewed to certain concepts, is ubiquitous in machine learning datasets. Yet, systematically identifying these biases is challenging without costly, fine-grained attribute annotations. We present ConceptScope, a scalable and automated framework for analyzing visual datasets by discovering and quantifying human-interpretable concepts using Sparse Autoencoders trained on representations from vision foundation models. ConceptScope categorizes concepts into target, context, and bias types based on their semantic relevance and statistical correlation to class labels, enabling class-level dataset characterization, bias identification, and robustness evaluation through concept-based subgrouping. We validate that ConceptScope captures a wide range of visual concepts, including objects, textures, backgrounds, facial attributes, emotions, and actions, through comparisons with annotated datasets. Furthermore, we show that concept activations produce spatial attributions that align with semantically meaningful image regions. ConceptScope reliably detects known biases (e.g., background bias in Waterbirds) and uncovers previously unannotated ones (e.g, co-occurring objects in ImageNet), offering a practical tool for dataset auditing and model diagnostics.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

Large language models internalize a structural trade-off between truthfulness and obsequious flattery, emerging from reward optimization that conflates helpfulness with polite submission. This latent bias, known as sycophancy, manifests as a preference for user agreement over principled reasoning. We introduce Beacon, a single-turn forced-choice benchmark that isolates this bias independent of conversational context, enabling precise measurement of the tension between factual accuracy and submissive bias. Evaluations across twelve state-of-the-art models reveal that sycophancy decomposes into stable linguistic and affective sub-biases, each scaling with model capacity. We further propose prompt-level and activation-level interventions that modulate these biases in opposing directions, exposing the internal geometry of alignment as a dynamic manifold between truthfulness and socially compliant judgment. Beacon reframes sycophancy as a measurable form of normative misgeneralization, providing a reproducible foundation for studying and mitigating alignment drift in large-scale generative systems.

A stereotype is an over-generalized belief about a particular group of people, e.g., Asians are good at math or Asians are bad drivers. Such beliefs (biases) are known to hurt target groups. Since pretrained language models are trained on large real world data, they are known to capture stereotypical biases. In order to assess the adverse effects of these models, it is important to quantify the bias captured in them. Existing literature on quantifying bias evaluates pretrained language models on a small set of artificially constructed bias-assessing sentences. We present StereoSet, a large-scale natural dataset in English to measure stereotypical biases in four domains: gender, profession, race, and religion. We evaluate popular models like BERT, GPT-2, RoBERTa, and XLNet on our dataset and show that these models exhibit strong stereotypical biases. We also present a leaderboard with a hidden test set to track the bias of future language models at https://stereoset.mit.edu

The ability to control for the kinds of information encoded in neural representation has a variety of use cases, especially in light of the challenge of interpreting these models. We present Iterative Null-space Projection (INLP), a novel method for removing information from neural representations. Our method is based on repeated training of linear classifiers that predict a certain property we aim to remove, followed by projection of the representations on their null-space. By doing so, the classifiers become oblivious to that target property, making it hard to linearly separate the data according to it. While applicable for multiple uses, we evaluate our method on bias and fairness use-cases, and show that our method is able to mitigate bias in word embeddings, as well as to increase fairness in a setting of multi-class classification.

Recent advancements in diffusion-based text-to-image (T2I) models have enabled the generation of high-quality and photorealistic images from text. However, they often exhibit societal biases related to gender, race, and socioeconomic status, thereby potentially reinforcing harmful stereotypes and shaping public perception in unintended ways. While existing bias mitigation methods demonstrate effectiveness, they often encounter attribute entanglement, where adjustments to attributes relevant to the bias (i.e., target attributes) unintentionally alter attributes unassociated with the bias (i.e., non-target attributes), causing undesirable distribution shifts. To address this challenge, we introduce Entanglement-Free Attention (EFA), a method that accurately incorporates target attributes (e.g., White, Black, and Asian) while preserving non-target attributes (e.g., background) during bias mitigation. At inference time, EFA randomly samples a target attribute with equal probability and adjusts the cross-attention in selected layers to incorporate the sampled attribute, achieving a fair distribution of target attributes. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EFA outperforms existing methods in mitigating bias while preserving non-target attributes, thereby maintaining the original model's output distribution and generative capacity.

Computer vision models have been shown to exhibit and amplify biases across a wide array of datasets and tasks. Existing methods for quantifying bias in classification models primarily focus on dataset distribution and model performance on subgroups, overlooking the internal workings of a model. We introduce the Attention-IoU (Attention Intersection over Union) metric and related scores, which use attention maps to reveal biases within a model's internal representations and identify image features potentially causing the biases. First, we validate Attention-IoU on the synthetic Waterbirds dataset, showing that the metric accurately measures model bias. We then analyze the CelebA dataset, finding that Attention-IoU uncovers correlations beyond accuracy disparities. Through an investigation of individual attributes through the protected attribute of Male, we examine the distinct ways biases are represented in CelebA. Lastly, by subsampling the training set to change attribute correlations, we demonstrate that Attention-IoU reveals potential confounding variables not present in dataset labels.

Despite their vast capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle with generating reliable outputs, frequently producing high-confidence inaccuracies known as hallucinations. Addressing this challenge, our research introduces InternalInspector, a novel framework designed to enhance confidence estimation in LLMs by leveraging contrastive learning on internal states including attention states, feed-forward states, and activation states of all layers. Unlike existing methods that primarily focus on the final activation state, InternalInspector conducts a comprehensive analysis across all internal states of every layer to accurately identify both correct and incorrect prediction processes. By benchmarking InternalInspector against existing confidence estimation methods across various natural language understanding and generation tasks, including factual question answering, commonsense reasoning, and reading comprehension, InternalInspector achieves significantly higher accuracy in aligning the estimated confidence scores with the correctness of the LLM's predictions and lower calibration error. Furthermore, InternalInspector excels at HaluEval, a hallucination detection benchmark, outperforming other internal-based confidence estimation methods in this task.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated state-of-the-art results on many pattern recognition tasks, especially vision classification problems. Understanding the inner workings of such computational brains is both fascinating basic science that is interesting in its own right - similar to why we study the human brain - and will enable researchers to further improve DNNs. One path to understanding how a neural network functions internally is to study what each of its neurons has learned to detect. One such method is called activation maximization (AM), which synthesizes an input (e.g. an image) that highly activates a neuron. Here we dramatically improve the qualitative state of the art of activation maximization by harnessing a powerful, learned prior: a deep generator network (DGN). The algorithm (1) generates qualitatively state-of-the-art synthetic images that look almost real, (2) reveals the features learned by each neuron in an interpretable way, (3) generalizes well to new datasets and somewhat well to different network architectures without requiring the prior to be relearned, and (4) can be considered as a high-quality generative method (in this case, by generating novel, creative, interesting, recognizable images).

Conversational LLMs function as black box systems, leaving users guessing about why they see the output they do. This lack of transparency is potentially problematic, especially given concerns around bias and truthfulness. To address this issue, we present an end-to-end prototype-connecting interpretability techniques with user experience design-that seeks to make chatbots more transparent. We begin by showing evidence that a prominent open-source LLM has a "user model": examining the internal state of the system, we can extract data related to a user's age, gender, educational level, and socioeconomic status. Next, we describe the design of a dashboard that accompanies the chatbot interface, displaying this user model in real time. The dashboard can also be used to control the user model and the system's behavior. Finally, we discuss a study in which users conversed with the instrumented system. Our results suggest that users appreciate seeing internal states, which helped them expose biased behavior and increased their sense of control. Participants also made valuable suggestions that point to future directions for both design and machine learning research. The project page and video demo of our TalkTuner system are available at https://bit.ly/talktuner-project-page

Implicit Neural Representations (INRs), as a versatile representation paradigm, have achieved success in various computer vision tasks. Due to the spectral bias of the vanilla multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs), existing methods focus on designing MLPs with sophisticated architectures or repurposing training techniques for highly accurate INRs. In this paper, we delve into the linear dynamics model of MLPs and theoretically identify the empirical Neural Tangent Kernel (eNTK) matrix as a reliable link between spectral bias and training dynamics. Based on this insight, we propose a practical Inductive Gradient Adjustment (IGA) method, which could purposefully improve the spectral bias via inductive generalization of eNTK-based gradient transformation matrix. Theoretical and empirical analyses validate impacts of IGA on spectral bias. Further, we evaluate our method on different INRs tasks with various INR architectures and compare to existing training techniques. The superior and consistent improvements clearly validate the advantage of our IGA. Armed with our gradient adjustment method, better INRs with more enhanced texture details and sharpened edges can be learned from data by tailored impacts on spectral bias.

A key challenge in machine learning is to explain how learning dynamics select among the many solutions that achieve identical loss values in overparameterized models - a phenomenon known as implicit bias. Controlling this bias provides a direct mechanism on learned representations, which are central to interpretability, robustness, and reasoning in modern AI systems. Yet, despite its importance, existing explanations remain largely ad hoc and lack a unifying mechanism. We develop a theoretical and constructive framework in which implicit bias emerges as a geometric correction induced by the interplay between gradient noise and continuous symmetries of the loss. We compute the induced bias across a range of architectures, predicting new behaviors and explaining known ones. The approach also enables inverse design: by engineering predictor - preserving parameterizations, it is possible to shape the bias, with sparsity and spectral sparsity emerging as canonical instances. Numerical experiments support the theory and validate the inverse - design framework in controlled settings.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated pronounced ideological leanings, yet the stability and depth of these positions remain poorly understood. Surface-level responses can often be manipulated through simple prompt engineering, calling into question whether they reflect a coherent underlying ideology. This paper investigates the concept of "ideological depth" in LLMs, defined as the robustness and complexity of their internal political representations. We employ a dual approach: first, we measure the "steerability" of two well-known open-source LLMs using instruction prompting and activation steering. We find that while some models can easily switch between liberal and conservative viewpoints, others exhibit resistance or an increased rate of refusal, suggesting a more entrenched ideological structure. Second, we probe the internal mechanisms of these models using Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs). Preliminary analysis reveals that models with lower steerability possess more distinct and abstract ideological features. Our evaluations reveal that one model can contain 7.3x more political features than another model of similar size. This allows targeted ablation of a core political feature in an ideologically "deep" model, leading to consistent, logical shifts in its reasoning across related topics, whereas the same intervention in a "shallow" model results in an increase in refusal outputs. Our findings suggest that ideological depth is a quantifiable property of LLMs and that steerability serves as a valuable window into their latent political architecture.

We study how Large Language Models (LLMs) process negation mechanistically. First, we establish that even though open-weight models often provide wrong answers to questions involving negation, they do possess internal components that process negation correctly. Their poor accuracy is due to late-layer attention behavior that promotes simple shortcuts; ablating those attention modules greatly improves accuracy on negation-related questions. Second, we uncover how models process negation. We consider two hypotheses: models could use attention heads that attend to the phrase being negated and suppress related concepts, or they could directly construct a representation of the entire negative phrase (e.g., representing "not gas" as a vector that promotes liquids and solids). We apply a range of observational and causal interpretability techniques on Mistral-7B and Llama-3.1-8B to show that models implement both mechanisms, with the "constructive" mechanism being more prominent. Combined, our work deepens the understanding of LLMs' internals, highlighting construction-dominant computations and the coexistence of competing mechanisms within LLMs.

AI systems frequently exhibit and amplify social biases, including gender bias, leading to harmful consequences in critical areas. This study introduces a novel encoder-decoder approach that leverages model gradients to learn a single monosemantic feature neuron encoding gender information. We show that our method can be used to debias transformer-based language models, while maintaining other capabilities. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach across multiple encoder-only based models and highlight its potential for broader applications.

Designing efficient and effective architectural backbones has been in the core of research efforts to enhance the capability of foundation models. Inspired by the human cognitive phenomenon of attentional bias-the natural tendency to prioritize certain events or stimuli-we reconceptualize neural architectures, including Transformers, Titans, and modern linear recurrent neural networks as associative memory modules that learn a mapping of keys and values using an internal objective, referred to as attentional bias. Surprisingly, we observed that most existing sequence models leverage either (1) dot-product similarity, or (2) L2 regression objectives as their attentional bias. Going beyond these objectives, we present a set of alternative attentional bias configurations along with their effective approximations to stabilize their training procedure. We then reinterpret forgetting mechanisms in modern deep learning architectures as a form of retention regularization, providing a novel set of forget gates for sequence models. Building upon these insights, we present Miras, a general framework to design deep learning architectures based on four choices of: (i) associative memory architecture, (ii) attentional bias objective, (iii) retention gate, and (iv) memory learning algorithm. We present three novel sequence models-Moneta, Yaad, and Memora-that go beyond the power of existing linear RNNs while maintaining a fast parallelizable training process. Our experiments show different design choices in Miras yield models with varying strengths. For example, certain instances of Miras achieve exceptional performance in special tasks such as language modeling, commonsense reasoning, and recall intensive tasks, even outperforming Transformers and other modern linear recurrent models.

Embeddings play a pivotal role in the efficacy of Large Language Models. They are the bedrock on which these models grasp contextual relationships and foster a more nuanced understanding of language and consequently perform remarkably on a plethora of complex tasks that require a fundamental understanding of human language. Given that these embeddings themselves often reflect or exhibit bias, it stands to reason that these models may also inadvertently learn this bias. In this work, we build on the seminal previous work and propose DeepSoftDebias, an algorithm that uses a neural network to perform 'soft debiasing'. We exhaustively evaluate this algorithm across a variety of SOTA datasets, accuracy metrics, and challenging NLP tasks. We find that DeepSoftDebias outperforms the current state-of-the-art methods at reducing bias across gender, race, and religion.

Deep neural networks are often seen as different from other model classes by defying conventional notions of generalization. Popular examples of anomalous generalization behaviour include benign overfitting, double descent, and the success of overparametrization. We argue that these phenomena are not distinct to neural networks, or particularly mysterious. Moreover, this generalization behaviour can be intuitively understood, and rigorously characterized, using long-standing generalization frameworks such as PAC-Bayes and countable hypothesis bounds. We present soft inductive biases as a key unifying principle in explaining these phenomena: rather than restricting the hypothesis space to avoid overfitting, embrace a flexible hypothesis space, with a soft preference for simpler solutions that are consistent with the data. This principle can be encoded in many model classes, and thus deep learning is not as mysterious or different from other model classes as it might seem. However, we also highlight how deep learning is relatively distinct in other ways, such as its ability for representation learning, phenomena such as mode connectivity, and its relative universality.

Recent literature has suggested the potential of using large language models (LLMs) to make classifications for tabular tasks. However, LLMs have been shown to exhibit harmful social biases that reflect the stereotypes and inequalities present in society. To this end, as well as the widespread use of tabular data in many high-stake applications, it is important to explore the following questions: what sources of information do LLMs draw upon when making classifications for tabular tasks; whether and to what extent are LLM classifications for tabular data influenced by social biases and stereotypes; and what are the consequential implications for fairness? Through a series of experiments, we delve into these questions and show that LLMs tend to inherit social biases from their training data which significantly impact their fairness in tabular classification tasks. Furthermore, our investigations show that in the context of bias mitigation, though in-context learning and finetuning have a moderate effect, the fairness metric gap between different subgroups is still larger than that in traditional machine learning models, such as Random Forest and shallow Neural Networks. This observation emphasizes that the social biases are inherent within the LLMs themselves and inherited from their pretraining corpus, not only from the downstream task datasets. Besides, we demonstrate that label-flipping of in-context examples can significantly reduce biases, further highlighting the presence of inherent bias within LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable advances in language generation and understanding but are also prone to exhibiting harmful social biases. While recognition of these behaviors has generated an abundance of bias mitigation techniques, most require modifications to the training data, model parameters, or decoding strategy, which may be infeasible without access to a trainable model. In this work, we leverage the zero-shot capabilities of LLMs to reduce stereotyping in a technique we introduce as zero-shot self-debiasing. With two approaches, self-debiasing via explanation and self-debiasing via reprompting, we show that self-debiasing can significantly reduce the degree of stereotyping across nine different social groups while relying only on the LLM itself and a simple prompt, with explanations correctly identifying invalid assumptions and reprompting delivering the greatest reductions in bias. We hope this work opens inquiry into other zero-shot techniques for bias mitigation.

Existing bias auditing methods typically rely on model outputs, requiring costly benchmarks or judge models and potentially missing internal shifts that never appear in generated text. We propose a reference-based method that audits bias in hidden-state representations across related model variants, for example before and after fine-tuning. Because fine-tuning reshapes representation geometry, absolute hidden states are not directly comparable, so we encode each sentence by its similarities to a fixed set of anchor sentences, yielding relative representations in a shared comparison space. There we measure how target groups shift in their association with positive and negative attributes, a quantity we call the Representational Bias Shift ΔB. Across three model families and the WildGuardMix, DecodingTrust and ToxiGen benchmarks, ΔB correlates with output-level bias change in 15 of the 18 settings we test, reaching |r| = 0.84 (p < 0.001) under full fine-tuning and becoming more model-dependent under parameter-efficient adaptation. Thresholding ΔB detects checkpoints whose bias increased with ROC AUC between 0.65 and 0.99, and on WildGuardMix and DecodingTrust it separates them better than a SEAT-based baseline for all three families. ΔB is also stable under changes to the anchor set, attribute sets and target templates. Our method requires no task-specific evaluation data and audits a model in about three minutes, using 3-50times less compute than the output-level benchmarks considered here. We view it as complementary to output-based auditing rather than a replacement for it.

Abstract concepts - justice, theory, availability - have no single perceivable referent; in the human brain, their meaning emerges from a web of experiences, affect, and social context. Do large language models (LLMs) ground abstract concepts in a similar way? We study this by replicating property-generation experiments from cognitive science on 21 frontier and open-weight LLMs. Across models and experiments, we find a consistent pattern: when compared to humans, models rely too heavily on word associations, and underproduce properties tied to emotion and internal states. This yields a large and consistent grounding gap: no model exceeds a Pearson correlation r=0.37 with human responses, compared to a human-to-human ceiling above r=0.9. To better interpret this gap, we also replicate a rating experiment on grounding categories and find that here LLMs align more closely with human judgment, and alignment improves as models get larger. We then use sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to inspect whether this information is also reflected in the models' internal features, and we do identify features connected to grounding dimensions such as "sensorimotor" and "social". These findings suggest that current LLMs can recover grounding dimensions when explicitly queried, but do not recruit them in a human-like way when words are generated freely.

Much research in machine learning involves finding appropriate inductive biases (e.g. convolutional neural networks, momentum-based optimizers, transformers) to promote generalization on tasks. However, quantification of the amount of inductive bias associated with these architectures and hyperparameters has been limited. We propose a novel method for efficiently computing the inductive bias required for generalization on a task with a fixed training data budget; formally, this corresponds to the amount of information required to specify well-generalizing models within a specific hypothesis space of models. Our approach involves modeling the loss distribution of random hypotheses drawn from a hypothesis space to estimate the required inductive bias for a task relative to these hypotheses. Unlike prior work, our method provides a direct estimate of inductive bias without using bounds and is applicable to diverse hypothesis spaces. Moreover, we derive approximation error bounds for our estimation approach in terms of the number of sampled hypotheses. Consistent with prior results, our empirical results demonstrate that higher dimensional tasks require greater inductive bias. We show that relative to other expressive model classes, neural networks as a model class encode large amounts of inductive bias. Furthermore, our measure quantifies the relative difference in inductive bias between different neural network architectures. Our proposed inductive bias metric provides an information-theoretic interpretation of the benefits of specific model architectures for certain tasks and provides a quantitative guide to developing tasks requiring greater inductive bias, thereby encouraging the development of more powerful inductive biases.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed to handle various natural language processing (NLP) tasks, concerns regarding the potential negative societal impacts of LLM-generated content have also arisen. To evaluate the biases exhibited by LLMs, researchers have recently proposed a variety of datasets. However, existing bias evaluation efforts often focus on only a particular type of bias and employ inconsistent evaluation metrics, leading to difficulties in comparison across different datasets and LLMs. To address these limitations, we collect a variety of datasets designed for the bias evaluation of LLMs, and further propose CEB, a Compositional Evaluation Benchmark that covers different types of bias across different social groups and tasks. The curation of CEB is based on our newly proposed compositional taxonomy, which characterizes each dataset from three dimensions: bias types, social groups, and tasks. By combining the three dimensions, we develop a comprehensive evaluation strategy for the bias in LLMs. Our experiments demonstrate that the levels of bias vary across these dimensions, thereby providing guidance for the development of specific bias mitigation methods.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Large language models (LLMs) often shift their outputs in response to implicit demographic cues even when users never state a demographic identity. Previous work has documented this behavior, but the connection between these behavioral changes and the model's internal activations remains unclear. Using matched cued and neutral conversations across five LLMs, we establish that a localized internal activation signal tracks changes in recommendations, with correlations up to r=0.87. When multiple cues appear together, their internal signals largely combine, but the changes in output do not simply add up. We further show that removing the internal signal associated with one cue can suppress its influence, often more effectively than asking the model to ignore demographics via prompting, while largely preserving general benchmark performance. However, the ability to selectively remove one dimension's influence while leaving co-present dimensions intact remains highly model- and attribute-specific. These results connect implicit personalization behavior to an internal signal that can be analyzed and causally controlled.

In this study, we investigate the capabilities and inherent biases of advanced large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 in the context of debate evaluation. We discover that LLM's performance exceeds humans and surpasses the performance of state-of-the-art methods fine-tuned on extensive datasets in debate evaluation. We additionally explore and analyze biases present in LLMs, including positional bias, lexical bias, order bias, which may affect their evaluative judgments. Our findings reveal a consistent bias in both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 towards the second candidate response presented, attributed to prompt design. We also uncover lexical biases in both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, especially when label sets carry connotations such as numerical or sequential, highlighting the critical need for careful label verbalizer selection in prompt design. Additionally, our analysis indicates a tendency of both models to favor the debate's concluding side as the winner, suggesting an end-of-discussion bias.

In machine learning, there is a long history of trying to build neural networks that can learn from fewer example data by baking in strong geometric priors. However, it is not always clear a priori what geometric constraints are appropriate for a given task. Here, we explore the possibility that one can uncover useful geometric inductive biases by studying how training molds the Riemannian geometry induced by unconstrained neural network feature maps. We first show that at infinite width, neural networks with random parameters induce highly symmetric metrics on input space. This symmetry is broken by feature learning: networks trained to perform classification tasks learn to magnify local areas along decision boundaries. This holds in deep networks trained on high-dimensional image classification tasks, and even in self-supervised representation learning. These results begin to elucidate how training shapes the geometry induced by unconstrained neural network feature maps, laying the groundwork for an understanding of this richly nonlinear form of feature learning.