Daily Papers

Classical convergence guarantees for gradient-based learning in games require the pseudo-gradient to be (strongly) monotone in Euclidean geometry as shown by rosen(1965), a condition that often fails even in simple games with strong cross-player couplings. We introduce Small-Gain Nash (SGN), a block small-gain condition in a custom block-weighted geometry. SGN converts local curvature and cross-player Lipschitz coupling bounds into a tractable certificate of contraction. It constructs a weighted block metric in which the pseudo-gradient becomes strongly monotone on any region where these bounds hold, even when it is non-monotone in the Euclidean sense. The continuous flow is exponentially contracting in this designed geometry, and projected Euler and RK4 discretizations converge under explicit step-size bounds derived from the SGN margin and a local Lipschitz constant. Our analysis reveals a certified ``timescale band'', a non-asymptotic, metric-based certificate that plays a TTUR-like role: rather than forcing asymptotic timescale separation via vanishing, unequal step sizes, SGN identifies a finite band of relative metric weights for which a single-step-size dynamics is provably contractive. We validate the framework on quadratic games where Euclidean monotonicity analysis fails to predict convergence, but SGN successfully certifies it, and extend the construction to mirror/Fisher geometries for entropy-regularized policy gradient in Markov games. The result is an offline certification pipeline that estimates curvature, coupling, and Lipschitz parameters on compact regions, optimizes block weights to enlarge the SGN margin, and returns a structural, computable convergence certificate consisting of a metric, contraction rate, and safe step-sizes for non-monotone games.

Self-play (SP) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework for solving competitive games, where each agent optimizes policy by treating others as part of the environment. Despite the empirical successes, the theoretical properties of SP-based methods are limited to two-player zero-sum games. However, for mixed cooperative-competitive games where agents on the same team need to cooperate with each other, we can show a simple counter-example where SP-based methods cannot converge to a global Nash equilibrium (NE) with high probability. Alternatively, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is an iterative framework for learning NE, where the best responses w.r.t. previous policies are learned in each iteration. PSRO can be directly extended to mixed cooperative-competitive settings by jointly learning team best responses with all convergence properties unchanged. However, PSRO requires repeatedly training joint policies from scratch till convergence, which makes it hard to scale to complex games. In this work, we develop a novel algorithm, Fictitious Cross-Play (FXP), which inherits the benefits from both frameworks. FXP simultaneously trains an SP-based main policy and a counter population of best response policies. The main policy is trained by fictitious self-play and cross-play against the counter population, while the counter policies are trained as the best responses to the main policy's past versions. We validate our method in matrix games and show that FXP converges to global NEs while SP methods fail. We also conduct experiments in a gridworld domain, where FXP achieves higher Elo ratings and lower exploitabilities than baselines, and a more challenging football game, where FXP defeats SOTA models with over 94% win rate.

We introduce the first multiplayer world model for highly dynamic environments governed by complex physical interactions. Whereas single-player world models treat the other agents as part of the environment, ours conditions on the action streams of multiple agents, learning to attribute changes in the scene to the correct player and to stay coherent under arbitrary combinations of their actions. We study this problem in the game of Rocket League, where players compete and cooperate under fast, tightly coupled dynamics. Trained on 10,000 hours of gameplay collected with publicly available bots, our 5-billion-parameter latent diffusion model generates four-player matches in real time, producing 20 frames per second on a single Nvidia B200 GPU. Although trained only on short clips, its rollouts stay stable far beyond the training horizon: distributional quality holds steady out to five minutes, the longest horizon we measure, and in practice we observe rollouts continuing for hours with no sign of collapse. We systematically investigate the central design choices: the video codec, the generative objective, and the multiplayer conditioning scheme. In addition, we characterize how behavior changes with model and data scale, including the capabilities that emerge and the failure modes that persist. We further develop targeted evaluations that probe the model's physical understanding rather than visual appearance alone. To support continued research on multiplayer world models, we release our dataset, our full training and inference codebase, and a live demo.

Despite the recent success of reinforcement learning in various domains, these approaches remain, for the most part, deterringly sensitive to hyper-parameters and are often riddled with essential engineering feats allowing their success. We consider the case of off-policy generative adversarial imitation learning, and perform an in-depth review, qualitative and quantitative, of the method. We show that forcing the learned reward function to be local Lipschitz-continuous is a sine qua non condition for the method to perform well. We then study the effects of this necessary condition and provide several theoretical results involving the local Lipschitzness of the state-value function. We complement these guarantees with empirical evidence attesting to the strong positive effect that the consistent satisfaction of the Lipschitzness constraint on the reward has on imitation performance. Finally, we tackle a generic pessimistic reward preconditioning add-on spawning a large class of reward shaping methods, which makes the base method it is plugged into provably more robust, as shown in several additional theoretical guarantees. We then discuss these through a fine-grained lens and share our insights. Crucially, the guarantees derived and reported in this work are valid for any reward satisfying the Lipschitzness condition, nothing is specific to imitation. As such, these may be of independent interest.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, reward-based methods built on the Bradley-Terry assumption struggle to capture the non-transitive and heterogeneous nature of real-world preferences. To address this, recent studies have reframed alignment as a two-player Nash game, giving rise to Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF). While this perspective has inspired algorithms such as INPO, ONPO, and EGPO with strong theoretical and empirical guarantees, they remain fundamentally restricted to two-player interactions, creating a single-opponent bias that fails to capture the full complexity of realistic preference structures. In this work, we introduce Multiplayer Nash Preference Optimization (MNPO), a novel framework that generalizes NLHF to the multiplayer regime. It formulates alignment as an n-player game, where each policy competes against a population of opponents while being regularized toward a reference model. Our framework establishes well-defined Nash equilibria in multiplayer settings and extends the concept of duality gap to quantify approximation quality. We demonstrate that MNPO inherits the equilibrium guarantees of two-player methods while enabling richer competitive dynamics and improved coverage of diverse preference structures. Through comprehensive empirical evaluation, we show that MNPO consistently outperforms existing NLHF baselines on instruction-following benchmarks, achieving superior alignment quality under heterogeneous annotator conditions and mixed-policy evaluation scenarios. Together, these results establish MNPO as a principled and scalable framework for aligning LLMs with complex, non-transitive human preferences. Code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/MNPO.

Multi-turn, multi-agent LLM game evaluations often exhibit substantial run-to-run variance. In long-horizon interactions, small early deviations compound across turns and are amplified by multi-agent coupling. This biases win rate estimates and makes rankings unreliable across repeated tournaments. Prompt choice worsens this further by producing different effective policies. We address both instability and underperformance with MEMO (Memory-augmented MOdel context optimization), a self-play framework that optimizes inference-time context by coupling retention and exploration. Retention maintains a persistent memory bank that stores structured insights from self-play trajectories and injects them as priors during later play. Exploration runs tournament-style prompt evolution with uncertainty-aware selection via TrueSkill, and uses prioritized replay to revisit rare and decisive states. Across five text-based games, MEMO raises mean win rate from 25.1% to 49.5% for GPT-4o-mini and from 20.9% to 44.3% for Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct, using 2,000 self-play games per task. Run-to-run variance also drops, giving more stable rankings across prompt variations. These results suggest that multi-agent LLM game performance and robustness have substantial room for improvement through context optimization. MEMO achieves the largest gains in negotiation and imperfect-information games, while RL remains more effective in perfect-information settings.

Follow the regularized leader FTRL is the premier algorithm for online optimization. However, despite decades of research on its convergence in constrained optimization -- and potential games in particular -- its behavior remained hitherto poorly understood. In this paper, we establish that FTRL can take exponential time to converge to a Nash equilibrium in two-player potential games for any (permutation-invariant) regularizer and potentially vanishing learning rate. By known equivalences, this translates to an exponential lower bound for certain mirror descent counterparts, most notably multiplicative weights update. On the positive side, we establish the potential property for FTRL and obtain an exponential upper bound exp(O_ε(1/ε^2)) for any no-regret dynamics executed in a lazy, alternating fashion, matching our lower bound up to factors in the exponent. Finally, in multi-player potential games, we show that fictitious play -- the extreme version of FTRL -- can take doubly exponential time to reach a Nash equilibrium. This constitutes an exponentially stronger lower bound for the foundational learning algorithm in games.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

LLMs-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent environments where strategic interaction and coordination are required. While existing work has largely focused on individual agents or on interacting agents sharing explicit communication, less is known about how interacting agents coordinate implicitly. In particular, agents may engage in covert communication, relying on indirect or non-linguistic signals embedded in their actions rather than on explicit messages. This paper presents a game-theoretic study of covert communication in LLM-driven multi-agent systems. We analyse interactions across four canonical game-theoretic settings under different communication regimes, including explicit, restricted, and absent communication. Considering heterogeneous agent personalities and both one-shot and repeated games, we characterise when covert signals emerge and how they shape coordination and strategic outcomes.

Probabilistic dynamics model ensemble is widely used in existing model-based reinforcement learning methods as it outperforms a single dynamics model in both asymptotic performance and sample efficiency. In this paper, we provide both practical and theoretical insights on the empirical success of the probabilistic dynamics model ensemble through the lens of Lipschitz continuity. We find that, for a value function, the stronger the Lipschitz condition is, the smaller the gap between the true dynamics- and learned dynamics-induced Bellman operators is, thus enabling the converged value function to be closer to the optimal value function. Hence, we hypothesize that the key functionality of the probabilistic dynamics model ensemble is to regularize the Lipschitz condition of the value function using generated samples. To test this hypothesis, we devise two practical robust training mechanisms through computing the adversarial noise and regularizing the value network's spectral norm to directly regularize the Lipschitz condition of the value functions. Empirical results show that combined with our mechanisms, model-based RL algorithms with a single dynamics model outperform those with an ensemble of probabilistic dynamics models. These findings not only support the theoretical insight, but also provide a practical solution for developing computationally efficient model-based RL algorithms.

We study a persistent failure mode in multi-objective alignment for large language models (LLMs): training improves performance on only a subset of objectives while causing others to degrade. We formalize this phenomenon as cross-objective interference and conduct the first systematic study across classic scalarization algorithms, showing that interference is pervasive and exhibits strong model dependence. To explain this phenomenon, we derive a local covariance law showing that an objective improves at first order when its reward exhibits positive covariance with the scalarized score. We extend this analysis to clipped surrogate objectives used in modern alignment, demonstrating that the covariance law remains valid under mild conditions despite clipping. Building on this analysis, we propose Covariance Targeted Weight Adaptation (CTWA), a plug-and-play method that maintains positive covariance between objective rewards and the training signal to effectively mitigate cross-objective interference. Finally, we complement these local improvement conditions with a global convergence analysis under the Polyak--Łojasiewicz condition, establishing when non-convex scalarized optimization achieves global convergence and how cross-objective interference depends on specific model geometric properties.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

Deep residual networks (ResNets) have demonstrated outstanding success in computer vision tasks, attributed to their ability to maintain gradient flow through deep architectures. Simultaneously, controlling the Lipschitz constant in neural networks has emerged as an essential area of research to enhance adversarial robustness and network certifiability. This paper presents a rigorous approach to the general design of L-Lipschitz deep residual networks using a Linear Matrix Inequality (LMI) framework. Initially, the ResNet architecture was reformulated as a cyclic tridiagonal LMI, and closed-form constraints on network parameters were derived to ensure L-Lipschitz continuity; however, using a new LDL^top decomposition approach for certifying LMI feasibility, we extend the construction of L-Lipchitz networks to any other nonlinear architecture. Our contributions include a provable parameterization methodology for constructing Lipschitz-constrained residual networks and other hierarchical architectures. Cholesky decomposition is also used for efficient parameterization. These findings enable robust network designs applicable to adversarial robustness, certified training, and control systems. The LDL^top formulation is shown to be a tight relaxation of the SDP-based network, maintaining full expressiveness and achieving 3\%-13\% accuracy gains over SLL Layers on 121 UCI data sets.

Human team tactics emerge from each player's individual perspective and their ability to anticipate, interpret, and adapt to teammates' intentions. While advances in video understanding have improved the modeling of team interactions in sports, most existing work relies on third-person broadcast views and overlooks the synchronous, egocentric nature of multi-agent learning. We introduce X-Ego-CS, a benchmark dataset consisting of 124 hours of gameplay footage from 45 professional-level matches of the popular e-sports game Counter-Strike 2, designed to facilitate research on multi-agent decision-making in complex 3D environments. X-Ego-CS provides cross-egocentric video streams that synchronously capture all players' first-person perspectives along with state-action trajectories. Building on this resource, we propose Cross-Ego Contrastive Learning (CECL), which aligns teammates' egocentric visual streams to foster team-level tactical situational awareness from an individual's perspective. We evaluate CECL on a teammate-opponent location prediction task, demonstrating its effectiveness in enhancing an agent's ability to infer both teammate and opponent positions from a single first-person view using state-of-the-art video encoders. Together, X-Ego-CS and CECL establish a foundation for cross-egocentric multi-agent benchmarking in esports. More broadly, our work positions gameplay understanding as a testbed for multi-agent modeling and tactical learning, with implications for spatiotemporal reasoning and human-AI teaming in both virtual and real-world domains. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/HATS-ICT/x-ego.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the last-iterate to a Nash equilibrium. Although the non-bandit case has been studied extensively, this setting has only been explored recently, with a bound of O(T^{-1/8}) on the exploitability gap. We show that, for uncoupled algorithms, guaranteeing convergence of the policy profiles to a Nash equilibrium is detrimental to the performance, with the best attainable rate being Ω(T^{-1/4}) in contrast to the usual Ω(T^{-1/2}) rate for convergence of the average iterates. We then propose two algorithms that achieve this optimal rate up to constant and logarithmic factors. The first algorithm leverages a straightforward trade-off between exploration and exploitation, while the second employs a regularization technique based on a two-step mirror descent approach.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

Optimization analyses for cross-entropy training rely on local Taylor models of the loss to predict whether a proposed step will decrease the objective. These surrogates are reliable only inside the Taylor convergence radius of the true loss along the update direction. That radius is set not by real-line curvature alone but by the nearest complex singularity. For cross-entropy, the softmax partition function F=sum_j exp(z_j) has complex zeros -- ``ghosts of softmax'' -- that induce logarithmic singularities in the loss and cap this radius. To make this geometry usable, we derive closed-form expressions under logit linearization along the proposed update direction. In the binary case, the exact radius is ρ^*=δ^2+ π^2/Δ_a. In the multiclass case, we obtain the lower bound ρ_a=π/Δ_a, where Δ_a=max_k a_k-min_k a_k is the spread of directional logit derivatives a_k=nabla z_kcdot v. This bound costs one Jacobian-vector product and reveals what makes a step fragile: samples that are both near a decision flip and highly sensitive to the proposed direction tighten the radius. The normalized step size r=τ/ρ_a separates safe from dangerous updates. Across six tested architectures and multiple step directions, no model fails for r<1, yet collapse appears once rge 1. Temperature scaling confirms the mechanism: normalizing by ρ_a shrinks the onset-threshold spread from standard deviation 0.992 to 0.164. A controller that enforces τleρ_a survives learning-rate spikes up to 10{,} 000times in our tests, where gradient clipping still collapses. Together, these results identify a geometric constraint on cross-entropy optimization that operates through Taylor convergence rather than Hessian curvature.

Achieving cooperation among self-interested agents remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent work showed that mutual cooperation can be induced between "learning-aware" agents that account for and shape the learning dynamics of their co-players. However, existing approaches typically rely on hardcoded, often inconsistent, assumptions about co-player learning rules or enforce a strict separation between "naive learners" updating on fast timescales and "meta-learners" observing these updates. Here, we demonstrate that the in-context learning capabilities of sequence models allow for co-player learning awareness without requiring hardcoded assumptions or explicit timescale separation. We show that training sequence model agents against a diverse distribution of co-players naturally induces in-context best-response strategies, effectively functioning as learning algorithms on the fast intra-episode timescale. We find that the cooperative mechanism identified in prior work-where vulnerability to extortion drives mutual shaping-emerges naturally in this setting: in-context adaptation renders agents vulnerable to extortion, and the resulting mutual pressure to shape the opponent's in-context learning dynamics resolves into the learning of cooperative behavior. Our results suggest that standard decentralized reinforcement learning on sequence models combined with co-player diversity provides a scalable path to learning cooperative behaviors.

Deep residual networks (ResNets) have demonstrated outstanding success in computer vision tasks, attributed to their ability to maintain gradient flow through deep architectures. Simultaneously, controlling the Lipschitz bound in neural networks has emerged as an essential area of research for enhancing adversarial robustness and network certifiability. This paper uses a rigorous approach to design L-Lipschitz deep residual networks using a Linear Matrix Inequality (LMI) framework. The ResNet architecture was reformulated as a pseudo-tri-diagonal LMI with off-diagonal elements and derived closed-form constraints on network parameters to ensure L-Lipschitz continuity. To address the lack of explicit eigenvalue computations for such matrix structures, the Gershgorin circle theorem was employed to approximate eigenvalue locations, guaranteeing the LMI's negative semi-definiteness. Our contributions include a provable parameterization methodology for constructing Lipschitz-constrained networks and a compositional framework for managing recursive systems within hierarchical architectures. These findings enable robust network designs applicable to adversarial robustness, certified training, and control systems. However, a limitation was identified in the Gershgorin-based approximations, which over-constrain the system, suppressing non-linear dynamics and diminishing the network's expressive capacity.

Interactive world models for first-person shooter (FPS) games must resolve high-frequency overlapping control signals at every frame without disrupting unaffected regions. Existing methods inject actions globally and train on single titles, failing under dense FPS inputs. We observe that FPS actions are spatially selective: discrete events such as firing or reloading affect only a localized region around the weapon (the scope), while continuous camera and movement signals govern stable surroundings. We propose SCOPE, which inserts a conditioning module into each transformer block of a pretrained video diffusion model. It reshapes features into per-pixel temporal sequences so that each position computes its action response from local visual content. This separates in-scope effects from out-of-scope generation without segmentation labels. We also introduce CrossFPS, the first multi-game FPS dataset with frame-aligned action telemetry. It comprises 69K clips from 7 titles with 10-DoF controller signals, curated to remove gameplay bias. The model learns general visual-to-action mappings rather than game-specific patterns, enabling zero-shot transfer to unseen scenes. Experiments confirm strong action responsiveness, precise scope separation, and effective cross-game generalization.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

We investigate a primal-dual (PD) method for the saddle point problem (SPP) that uses a linear approximation of the primal function instead of the standard proximal step, resulting in a linearized PD (LPD) method. For convex-strongly concave SPP, we observe that the LPD method has a suboptimal dependence on the Lipschitz constant of the primal function. To fix this issue, we combine features of Accelerated Gradient Descent with the LPD method resulting in a single-loop Accelerated Linearized Primal-Dual (ALPD) method. ALPD method achieves the optimal gradient complexity when the SPP has a semi-linear coupling function. We also present an inexact ALPD method for SPPs with a general nonlinear coupling function that maintains the optimal gradient evaluations of the primal parts and significantly improves the gradient evaluations of the coupling term compared to the ALPD method. We verify our findings with numerical experiments.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

We study how to learn ε-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of episodes, denoted by T. Existing procedures suffer from high variance due to the use of importance sampling over sequences of actions (Steinberger et al., 2020; McAleer et al., 2022). To reduce this variance, we consider a fixed sampling approach, where players still update their policies over time, but with observations obtained through a given fixed sampling policy. Our approach is based on an adaptive Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm that applies OMD locally to each information set, using individually decreasing learning rates and a regularized loss. We show that this approach guarantees a convergence rate of mathcal{O}(T^{-1/2}) with high probability and has a near-optimal dependence on the game parameters when applied with the best theoretical choices of learning rates and sampling policies. To achieve these results, we generalize the notion of OMD stabilization, allowing for time-varying regularization with convex increments.

This paper investigates a novel lossy compression framework operating under logarithmic loss, designed to handle situations where the reconstruction distribution diverges from the source distribution. This framework is especially relevant for applications that require joint compression and retrieval, and in scenarios involving distributional shifts due to processing. We show that the proposed formulation extends the classical minimum entropy coupling framework by integrating a bottleneck, allowing for a controlled degree of stochasticity in the coupling. We explore the decomposition of the Minimum Entropy Coupling with Bottleneck (MEC-B) into two distinct optimization problems: Entropy-Bounded Information Maximization (EBIM) for the encoder, and Minimum Entropy Coupling (MEC) for the decoder. Through extensive analysis, we provide a greedy algorithm for EBIM with guaranteed performance, and characterize the optimal solution near functional mappings, yielding significant theoretical insights into the structural complexity of this problem. Furthermore, we illustrate the practical application of MEC-B through experiments in Markov Coding Games (MCGs) under rate limits. These games simulate a communication scenario within a Markov Decision Process, where an agent must transmit a compressed message from a sender to a receiver through its actions. Our experiments highlight the trade-offs between MDP rewards and receiver accuracy across various compression rates, showcasing the efficacy of our method compared to conventional compression baseline.

Large Language model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are prone to cascading risks, where early-stage interactions remain semantically fluent and policy-compliant, yet the underlying interaction dynamics begin to distort in ways that amplify latent instability or misalignment. Traditional auditing methods that focus on per-message semantic content are inherently reactive and lagging, failing to capture these early structural precursors. In this paper, we propose a principled framework for cascading-risk detection grounded in semantic--geometric co-evolution. We model MAS interactions as dynamic graphs and introduce Ollivier--Ricci Curvature (ORC) -- a discrete geometric measure -- to characterize information redundancy and bottleneck formation in communication topologies. By coupling semantic flow signals with graph geometry, the framework learns the normal co-evolutionary dynamics of trusted collaboration and treats deviations from this coupled manifold as early-warning signals. Experiments on a suite of cascading-risk scenarios aligned with the risk category demonstrate that curvature anomalies systematically precede explicit semantic violations by several interaction turns, enabling proactive intervention. Furthermore, the local nature of Ricci curvature provides principled interpretability for root-cause attribution, identifying specific agents or links that precipitate the collapse of trustworthy collaboration.

Recent advances in joint audio-video generation have been remarkable, yet real-world applications demand strong per-modality fidelity, cross-modal alignment, and fine-grained synchronization. Reinforcement Learning (RL) offers a promising paradigm, but its extension to multi-objective and multi-modal joint audio-video generation remains unexplored. Notably, our in-depth analysis first reveals that the primary obstacles to applying RL in this stem from: (i) multi-objective advantages inconsistency, where the advantages of multimodal outputs are not always consistent within a group; (ii) multi-modal gradients imbalance, where video-branch gradients leak into shallow audio layers responsible for intra-modal generation; (iii) uniform credit assignment, where fine-grained cross-modal alignment regions fail to get efficient exploration. These shortcomings suggest that vanilla RL fine-tuning strategy with a single global advantage often leads to suboptimal results. To address these challenges, we propose OmniNFT, a novel modality-aware online diffusion RL framework with three key innovations: (1) Modality-wise advantage routing, which routes independent per-reward advantages to their respective modality generation branches. (2) Layer-wise gradient surgery, which selectively detaches video-branch gradients on shallow audio layers while retaining those for cross-modal interaction layers. (3) Region-wise loss reweighting, which modulates policy optimization toward critical regions related to audio-video synchronization and fine-grained alignment. Extensive experiments on JavisBench and VBench with the LTX-2 backbone demonstrate that OmniNFT achieves comprehensive improvements in audio and video perceptual quality, cross-modal alignment, and audio-video synchronization.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

The entropic fictitious play (EFP) is a recently proposed algorithm that minimizes the sum of a convex functional and entropy in the space of measures -- such an objective naturally arises in the optimization of a two-layer neural network in the mean-field regime. In this work, we provide a concise primal-dual analysis of EFP in the setting where the learning problem exhibits a finite-sum structure. We establish quantitative global convergence guarantees for both the continuous-time and discrete-time dynamics based on properties of a proximal Gibbs measure introduced in Nitanda et al. (2022). Furthermore, our primal-dual framework entails a memory-efficient particle-based implementation of the EFP update, and also suggests a connection to gradient boosting methods. We illustrate the efficiency of our novel implementation in experiments including neural network optimization and image synthesis.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

World models for interactive video generation have largely focused on single-agent settings, where future observations are generated from a single control signal. However, many generated environments require multi-agent interaction: multiple players, robots, or embodied agents act simultaneously within a shared space. Scaling world models to such settings requires a principled multi-agent design: agents should remain independently controllable, permutation-symmetric, and support efficient inference while maintaining consistency across time and perspectives. In this paper, we present our generative multi-agent world model for interactive simulation. It introduces Simplex Rotary Agent Encoding, a parameter-free extension of 3D RoPE that represents agents as vertices of a regular simplex in rotary angle space. This gives each agent a distinct phase while making all agents permutation-equivalent, enabling scalable agent identity without learned per-slot identities or a fixed agent ordering. To avoid dense all-to-all attention across agents, we further propose Sparse Hub Attention, where learnable hub tokens mediate token interaction across agents, reducing cross-agent attention cost from quadratic to linear in the number of agents. For real-time rollout, we distill a full-context diffusion teacher into a causal student that generates temporal blocks sequentially with KV caching, enabling action-responsive generation at 24 FPS. Experiments in multiplayer virtual environments show that our model improves video fidelity, action controllability, and inter-agent consistency over slot-based and dense-attention baselines, while generalizing from two to four players without additional training.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

Humans exhibit remarkable abilities to coordinate in groups. As large language models (LLMs) become more capable, it remains an open question whether they can demonstrate comparable adaptive coordination and whether they use the same strategies as humans. To investigate this, we compare LLM and human performance on a common-interest game with imperfect monitoring: Group Binary Search. In this n-player game, participants need to coordinate their actions to achieve a common objective. Players independently submit numerical values in an effort to collectively sum to a randomly assigned target number. Without direct communication, they rely on group feedback to iteratively adjust their submissions until they reach the target number. Our findings show that, unlike humans who adapt and stabilize their behavior over time, LLMs often fail to improve across games and exhibit excessive switching, which impairs group convergence. Moreover, richer feedback (e.g., numerical error magnitude) benefits humans substantially but has small effects on LLMs. Taken together, by grounding the analysis in human baselines and mechanism-level metrics, including reactivity scaling, switching dynamics, and learning across games, we point to differences in human and LLM groups and provide a behaviorally grounded diagnostic for closing the coordination gap.

Diffusion-based lip synchronization models achieve strong visual quality and audio-visual alignment, but full-sequence bidirectional attention and many denoising steps make them impractical for real-time inference. We present Lip Forcing, to our knowledge the first autoregressive diffusion method for video-to-video (V2V) lip synchronization, which distills a 14B audio-conditioned bidirectional video diffusion teacher into causal students. At inference, the students generate each chunk in only two denoising steps without inference-time CFG, enabling real-time lip synchronization. A lip-sync-specific teacher-trajectory analysis reveals a CFG fidelity-sync tradeoff: no-CFG predictions favor reference fidelity, whereas CFG-guided predictions favor synchronization within a mid-trajectory band. Lip Forcing translates this finding into three analysis-derived components: Sync-Window DMD, a two-step inference schedule, and a SyncNet-based reward. We validate Lip Forcing at two student scales, both distilled from the 14B teacher. The 1.3B student crosses into real-time streaming at 31 FPS, 17.6times faster than its same-scale bidirectional model. The 14B student, the largest diffusion model reported for V2V lip synchronization, runs 39.8times faster than its teacher at comparable reference fidelity. Time-to-first-frame is sub-millisecond at both scales, far below every diffusion baseline.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Multi-agent LLM systems commonly use an orchestrator to decompose a task for a team of workers and then improve through textual reflection. Despite strong empirical results, these systems lack a unified account of coordination, memory improvement, and the role of external verification. We model orchestrator-worker interaction as a bilevel coordination game: under bounded coupling, the workers' local-update game is an approximate potential game whose equilibrium slack is controlled by decomposition quality. We then analyse reflection as stochastic movement over semantic memory states. For free-form reflection, we derive a finite-time upper bound, prove worst-case tightness, and give a positive lower bound under a falsifiable persistent-harm condition. We further prove an information-theoretic impossibility result: no gate that observes only the generated transcript can improve uniformly over text-indistinguishable environments, whereas an environment-grounded gate can. Motivated by this separation, we introduce Stochastic Reflective Memory Ascent (SRMA), which accepts a candidate memory only after a grounded evaluation risk strictly decreases. Under calibration and non-degenerate corrective mass, SRMA converges exactly, geometrically or polynomially; matching constructions show that both rate regimes are order-tight. We also provide confidence gating for stochastic evaluation and re-anchoring guarantees for piecewise-stationary environments. Experiments instantiate these objects with environment-grounded metrics and test the predicted coordination and drift laws. On 500 SWE-bench instances, the complete Kimi-based system resolves 72.2% versus a 70.8% public mini-SWE-agent reference. Code: https://github.com/YihangChen9/Bilevel-Coordinated-Reflection

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Neural networks are often highly sensitive to input and weight perturbations. This sensitivity has been linked to pathologies such as vulnerability to adversarial examples, divergent training, and overfitting. To combat these problems, past research has looked at building neural networks entirely from Lipschitz components. However, these techniques have not matured to the point where researchers have trained a modern architecture such as a transformer with a Lipschitz certificate enforced beyond initialization. To explore this gap, we begin by developing and benchmarking novel, computationally-efficient tools for maintaining norm-constrained weight matrices. Applying these tools, we are able to train transformer models with Lipschitz bounds enforced throughout training. We find that optimizer dynamics matter: switching from AdamW to Muon improves standard methods -- weight decay and spectral normalization -- allowing models to reach equal performance with a lower Lipschitz bound. Inspired by Muon's update having a fixed spectral norm, we co-design a weight constraint method that improves the Lipschitz vs. performance tradeoff on MLPs and 2M parameter transformers. Our 2-Lipschitz transformer on Shakespeare text reaches validation accuracy 60%. Scaling to 145M parameters, our 10-Lipschitz transformer reaches 21% accuracy on internet text. However, to match the NanoGPT baseline validation accuracy of 39.4%, our Lipschitz upper bound increases to 10^264. Nonetheless, our Lipschitz transformers train without stability measures such as layer norm, QK norm, and logit tanh softcapping.

Primal-dual safe RL methods commonly perform iterations between the primal update of the policy and the dual update of the Lagrange Multiplier. Such a training paradigm is highly susceptible to the error in cumulative cost estimation since this estimation serves as the key bond connecting the primal and dual update processes. We show that this problem causes significant underestimation of cost when using off-policy methods, leading to the failure to satisfy the safety constraint. To address this issue, we propose conservative policy optimization, which learns a policy in a constraint-satisfying area by considering the uncertainty in cost estimation. This improves constraint satisfaction but also potentially hinders reward maximization. We then introduce local policy convexification to help eliminate such suboptimality by gradually reducing the estimation uncertainty. We provide theoretical interpretations of the joint coupling effect of these two ingredients and further verify them by extensive experiments. Results on benchmark tasks show that our method not only achieves an asymptotic performance comparable to state-of-the-art on-policy methods while using much fewer samples, but also significantly reduces constraint violation during training. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZifanWu/CAL.

As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual incentives can undermine collective welfare. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been effective for aligning large language models (LLMs) in the single-agent regime, prior small-network results suggest that standard RL in multi-agent settings often converges to defecting, self-interested policies. We show the same effect in LLMs: despite cooperative priors, RL-trained LLM agents develop opportunistic behavior that can exploit even advanced closed-source models. To address this tendency of RL to converge to poor equilibria, we adapt a recent opponent-learning awareness algorithm, Advantage Alignment, to fine-tune LLMs toward multi-agent cooperation and non-exploitability. We then introduce a group-relative baseline that simplifies advantage computation in iterated games, enabling multi-agent training at LLM scale. We also contribute a novel social dilemma environment, Trust-and-Split, which requires natural language communication to achieve high collective welfare. Across a wide range of social dilemmas, policies learned with Advantage Alignment achieve higher collective payoffs while remaining robust against exploitation by greedy agents. We release all of our code to support future work on multi-agent RL training for LLMs.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) commonly adopts centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE), where centralized critics leverage global information to guide decentralized actors. However, centralized-decentralized mismatch (CDM) arises when the suboptimal behavior of one agent degrades others' learning. Prior approaches mitigate CDM through value decomposition, but linear decompositions allow per-agent gradients at the cost of limited expressiveness, while nonlinear decompositions improve representation but require centralized gradients, reintroducing CDM. To overcome this trade-off, we propose the multi-agent cross-entropy method (MCEM), combined with monotonic nonlinear critic decomposition (NCD). MCEM updates policies by increasing the probability of high-value joint actions, thereby excluding suboptimal behaviors. For sample efficiency, we extend off-policy learning with a modified k-step return and Retrace. Analysis and experiments demonstrate that MCEM outperforms state-of-the-art methods across both continuous and discrete action benchmarks.

The paradigm of agentic AI is shifting from engineered complex workflows to post-training native models. However, existing agents are typically confined to static, predefined action spaces--such as exclusively using APIs, GUI events, or robotic commands. This rigidity limits their adaptability in dynamic environments where the optimal granularity of interaction varies contextually. To bridge this gap, we propose CrossAgent, a unified agentic model that masters heterogeneous action spaces and autonomously selects the most effective interface for each step of a trajectory. We introduce a comprehensive training pipeline that integrates cold-start supervised fine-tuning with a Multi-Turn Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm. This approach enables the agent to learn adaptive action switching--balancing high-level efficiency with low-level precision--without human-specified rules. Extensive experiments on over 800 tasks in the open-world Minecraft environment demonstrate that CrossAgent achieves state-of-the-art performance. By dynamically leveraging the strengths of diverse action spaces, our model significantly outperforms fixed-action baselines, exhibiting superior generalization and efficiency in long-horizon reasoning. All code and models are available at https://github.com/CraftJarvis/OpenHA

We argue that multi-agent test-time evolution is not single-agent evolution replicated N times. A single-agent learner can only evolve its own context and memory. A multi-agent system additionally evolves who collaborates, how they collaborate, and how knowledge flows across the population. These components have no single-agent counterpart and can produce phenomena such as emergent specialization. Yet prior test-time methods either confine experiences to individual agents, forfeiting cross-agent learning, or broadcast symmetrically to all agents, erasing the specialization that makes collaboration valuable. We present EVOCHAMBER, a training-free framework that instantiates test-time evolution at three levels over a coevolving agent pool. At its core is CODREAM (Collaborative Dreaming), a post-task protocol triggered on team failure or disagreement, in which agents collaboratively reflect, distill insights, and route them asymmetrically from strong to weak agents on the failed niche, preserving specialization while filling knowledge gaps. Team-level operators assemble niche-conditioned teams and select collaboration structures online. Population-level lifecycle operators fork, merge, prune, and seed agents under performance pressure. On three heterogeneous task streams with Qwen3-8B, EVOCHAMBER reaches 63.9% on competition math, 75.7% on code, and 87.1% on multi-domain reasoning, outperforming the best baseline by 32% relative on math and confirming asymmetric cross-agent transfer as the primary driver in ablation. Starting from several identically initialized agents, four to five stable niche specialists spontaneously emerge, a structural signature of multi-agent evolution that no single-agent learner can express. See our code at: https://github.com/Mercury7353/EvoChamber

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

The task of lip synchronization (lip-sync) seeks to match the lips of human faces with different audio. It has various applications in the film industry as well as for creating virtual avatars and for video conferencing. This is a challenging problem as one needs to simultaneously introduce detailed, realistic lip movements while preserving the identity, pose, emotions, and image quality. Many of the previous methods trying to solve this problem suffer from image quality degradation due to a lack of complete contextual information. In this paper, we present Diff2Lip, an audio-conditioned diffusion-based model which is able to do lip synchronization in-the-wild while preserving these qualities. We train our model on Voxceleb2, a video dataset containing in-the-wild talking face videos. Extensive studies show that our method outperforms popular methods like Wav2Lip and PC-AVS in Fr\'echet inception distance (FID) metric and Mean Opinion Scores (MOS) of the users. We show results on both reconstruction (same audio-video inputs) as well as cross (different audio-video inputs) settings on Voxceleb2 and LRW datasets. Video results and code can be accessed from our project page ( https://soumik-kanad.github.io/diff2lip ).

We study the problem of learning minimax policies in zero-sum matrix games. Fiegel et al. (2025) recently showed that achieving last-iterate convergence in this setting is harder when the players are uncoupled, by proving a lower bound on the exploitability gap of Omega(t^{-1/4}). Some online mirror descent algorithms were proposed in the literature for this problem, but none have truly attained this rate yet. We show that the use of a log-barrier regularization, along with a dual-focused analysis, allows this O-tilde(t^{-1/4}) convergence with high-probability. We additionally extend our idea to the setting of extensive-form games, proving a bound with the same rate.

Smoothness and low dimensional structures play central roles in improving generalization and stability in learning and statistics. This work combines techniques from semi-infinite constrained learning and manifold regularization to learn representations that are globally smooth on a manifold. To do so, it shows that under typical conditions the problem of learning a Lipschitz continuous function on a manifold is equivalent to a dynamically weighted manifold regularization problem. This observation leads to a practical algorithm based on a weighted Laplacian penalty whose weights are adapted using stochastic gradient techniques. It is shown that under mild conditions, this method estimates the Lipschitz constant of the solution, learning a globally smooth solution as a byproduct. Experiments on real world data illustrate the advantages of the proposed method relative to existing alternatives.

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret relative to fully adversarial environments. We study this problem in the context of variationally stable games (a class of continuous games which includes all convex-concave and monotone games), and when the players only have access to noisy estimates of their individual payoff gradients. If the noise is additive, the game-theoretic and purely adversarial settings enjoy similar regret guarantees; however, if the noise is multiplicative, we show that the learners can, in fact, achieve constant regret. We achieve this faster rate via an optimistic gradient scheme with learning rate separation -- that is, the method's extrapolation and update steps are tuned to different schedules, depending on the noise profile. Subsequently, to eliminate the need for delicate hyperparameter tuning, we propose a fully adaptive method that attains nearly the same guarantees as its non-adapted counterpart, while operating without knowledge of either the game or of the noise profile.

AI agents negotiate and transact in natural language with unfamiliar counterparts: a buyer bot facing an unknown seller, or a procurement assistant negotiating with a supplier. In such interactions, the counterpart's LLM, prompts, control logic, and rule-based fallbacks are hidden, while each decision can have monetary consequences. We ask whether an agent can predict an unfamiliar counterpart's next decision from a few interactions. To avoid real-world logging confounds, we study this problem in controlled bargaining and negotiation games, formulating it as target-adaptive text-tabular prediction: each decision point is a table row combining structured game state, offer history, and dialogue, while K previous games of the same target agent, i.e., the counterpart being modeled, are provided in the prompt as labeled adaptation examples. Our model is built on a tabular foundation model that represents rows using game-state features and LLM-based text representations, and adds LLM-as-Observer as an additional representation: a small frozen LLM reads the decision-time state and dialogue; its answer is discarded, and its hidden state becomes a decision-oriented feature, making the LLM an encoder rather than a direct few-shot predictor. Training on 13 frontier-LLM agents and testing on 91 held-out scaffolded agents, the full model outperforms direct LLM-as-Predictor prompting and game+text features baselines. Within this tabular model, Observer features contribute beyond the other feature schemes: at K=16, they improve response-prediction AUC by about 4 points across both tasks and reduce bargaining offer-prediction error by 14%. These results show that formulating counterpart prediction as a target-adaptive text-tabular task enables effective adaptation, and that hidden LLM representations expose decision-relevant signals that direct prompting does not surface.

In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with adaptive opponents who can respond based on histories of play. The standard metric of external regret in online learning is known to fail to capture such adaptivity. To account for players' counterfactual reasoning, we introduce {\tt Repeated Policy Regret (RP-Regret)}, a game-theoretic metric that measures the difference between the realized and the best-in-hindsight accumulated utility when all players can respond to the history of play. Compared to existing regret notions in this setting, ours is native to repeated game playing, enabling stronger comparators and opponents with fewer constraints, while maintaining the possibility of finding better equilibria when all players minimize it. We first identify necessary conditions for obtaining {\tt RP-Regret} sublinear in time, on the variation of the player's comparator strategies in the regret definition and on the memories of both the comparator and opponents' strategies. We then study additional conditions and provable algorithms to minimize {\tt RP-Regret}, which is by definition non-convex in the strategy space. To address this challenge, we propose three algorithms: (i) one based on an optimization oracle, as assumed in some prior work in online non-convex learning; (ii) one that minimizes a convex and linearized surrogate of {\tt RP-Regret} at each iteration; (iii) one that directly minimizes {\tt RP-Regret} when opponents change strategies slowly. Furthermore, when all players can run algorithms to minimize the {\tt RP-Regret} (or its linearized variant), certain subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated game can be learned. We also provide experiments showing that minimizing our regret notions can lead to more cooperative solutions with higher utility in games such as Stag-Hunt.

LLMs are used predominantly in synchronous communication, where a human user and a model communicate in alternating turns. In contrast, many real-world settings are inherently asynchronous. For example, in group chats, online team meetings, or social games, there is no inherent notion of turns; therefore, the decision of when to speak forms a crucial part of the participant's decision making. In this work, we develop an adaptive asynchronous LLM-agent which, in addition to determining what to say, also decides when to say it. To evaluate our agent, we collect a unique dataset of online Mafia games, including both human participants, as well as our asynchronous agent. Overall, our agent performs on par with human players, both in game performance, as well as in its ability to blend in with the other human players. Our analysis shows that the agent's behavior in deciding when to speak closely mirrors human patterns, although differences emerge in message content. We release all our data and code to support and encourage further research for more realistic asynchronous communication between LLM agents. This work paves the way for integration of LLMs into realistic human group settings, from assistance in team discussions to educational and professional environments where complex social dynamics must be navigated.

Reinforcement learning for multi-turn agents suffers from a credit-assignment mismatch: rewards are sparse and trajectory-level, while success often hinges on a few local decisions. Existing online policy distillation (OPD) provides denser token-level supervision, but typically treats heterogeneous agent trajectories as monolithic strings rather than causal interaction units. We present StepOPSD, a post-rollout preference self-distillation framework that takes the agent step as the unit of credit redistribution. StepOPSD decomposes trajectories into action-centered step segments, rescoring them under hindsight-enriched teacher contexts and converting token-level log-probability gaps into sign-preserving advantage shaping with a normalized per-step credit budget before the GRPO update. Across ALFWorld and Search-QA with Qwen3-1.7B and Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct, StepOPSD attains best or second-best results on subsets most sensitive to local causal errors, including first-place performance on ALFWorld Heat (79.1%), PickTwo (95.0%), Search-QA TriviaQA (61.6%), and tied-best performance on HotpotQA (40.4%). The results further reveal a consistent two-knob law: smaller α_clip acts as a broadly stabilizing local trust region, whereas the optimal global mixing strength λ_mix remains task-dependent. These findings suggest that step-aware distillation is most useful when trajectory-level rewards are weakly aligned with the local action that determines downstream success.

For most of scientific history, researchers studying behavior could only infer hidden mechanisms from outward actions: an inverse problem that becomes more tractable when observation is augmented by targeted intervention. We pose a computational analogue: given only behavioral traces of an agent in a game environment, can a learner reconstruct the underlying decision program as executable code, and how much does this reconstruction improve with the ability to design controlled experiments? We introduce RevengeBench, a benchmark of 75 LLM generated, Elo-calibrated policies across five game environments, drawn from CodeClash tournament trajectories. The learner observes the hidden target policy play against sampled opponents and designs behavioral probes in the form of custom opponent policies that elicit informative behavior. It then submits an executable hypothesis, which is evaluated using continuous action-distance metrics. We further validate that recovered code carries informative signal in downstream player-versus-player tournaments. Across twelve frontier LLMs, recovery quality varies substantially (34 to 72% of initial distance closed), with reconstructed policies yielding measurable competitive advantage, particularly for weaker models that otherwise struggle to design effective counter-strategies. Our benchmark positions behavioral recovery of programmatic policies as a tractable inverse problem in code-space, opening a path to opponent modeling, policy interpretability, and the broader question of inferring latent mechanisms from observations.

Traditional Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) often relies on reward models, frequently assuming preference structures like the Bradley-Terry model, which may not accurately capture the complexities of real human preferences (e.g., intransitivity). Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) offers a more direct alternative by framing the problem as finding a Nash equilibrium of a game defined by these preferences. In this work, we introduce Nash Mirror Prox (Nash-MP), an online NLHF algorithm that leverages the Mirror Prox optimization scheme to achieve fast and stable convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis establishes that Nash-MP exhibits last-iterate linear convergence towards the beta-regularized Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove that the KL-divergence to the optimal policy decreases at a rate of order (1+2beta)^{-N/2}, where N is a number of preference queries. We further demonstrate last-iterate linear convergence for the exploitability gap and uniformly for the span semi-norm of log-probabilities, with all these rates being independent of the size of the action space. Furthermore, we propose and analyze an approximate version of Nash-MP where proximal steps are estimated using stochastic policy gradients, making the algorithm closer to applications. Finally, we detail a practical implementation strategy for fine-tuning large language models and present experiments that demonstrate its competitive performance and compatibility with existing methods.

Synthesizing realistic human-object interaction motions is a critical problem in VR/AR and human animation. Unlike the commonly studied scenarios involving a single human or hand interacting with one object, we address a more generic multi-body setting with arbitrary numbers of humans, hands, and objects. This complexity introduces significant challenges in synchronizing motions due to the high correlations and mutual influences among bodies. To address these challenges, we introduce SyncDiff, a novel method for multi-body interaction synthesis using a synchronized motion diffusion strategy. SyncDiff employs a single diffusion model to capture the joint distribution of multi-body motions. To enhance motion fidelity, we propose a frequency-domain motion decomposition scheme. Additionally, we introduce a new set of alignment scores to emphasize the synchronization of different body motions. SyncDiff jointly optimizes both data sample likelihood and alignment likelihood through an explicit synchronization strategy. Extensive experiments across four datasets with various multi-body configurations demonstrate the superiority of SyncDiff over existing state-of-the-art motion synthesis methods.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

A successful tactic that is followed by the scientific community for advancing AI is to treat games as problems, which has been proven to lead to various breakthroughs. We adapt this strategy in order to study Rocket League, a widely popular but rather under-explored 3D multiplayer video game with a distinct physics engine and complex dynamics that pose a significant challenge in developing efficient and high-performance game-playing agents. In this paper, we present Lucy-SKG, a Reinforcement Learning-based model that learned how to play Rocket League in a sample-efficient manner, outperforming by a notable margin the two highest-ranking bots in this game, namely Necto (2022 bot champion) and its successor Nexto, thus becoming a state-of-the-art agent. Our contributions include: a) the development of a reward analysis and visualization library, b) novel parameterizable reward shape functions that capture the utility of complex reward types via our proposed Kinesthetic Reward Combination (KRC) technique, and c) design of auxiliary neural architectures for training on reward prediction and state representation tasks in an on-policy fashion for enhanced efficiency in learning speed and performance. By performing thorough ablation studies for each component of Lucy-SKG, we showed their independent effectiveness in overall performance. In doing so, we demonstrate the prospects and challenges of using sample-efficient Reinforcement Learning techniques for controlling complex dynamical systems under competitive team-based multiplayer conditions.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

We present a novel approach to synthesize dexterous motions for physically simulated hands in tasks that require coordination between the control of two hands with high temporal precision. Instead of directly learning a joint policy to control two hands, our approach performs bimanual control through cooperative learning where each hand is treated as an individual agent. The individual policies for each hand are first trained separately, and then synchronized through latent space manipulation in a centralized environment to serve as a joint policy for two-hand control. By doing so, we avoid directly performing policy learning in the joint state-action space of two hands with higher dimensions, greatly improving the overall training efficiency. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach in the challenging guitar-playing task. The virtual guitarist trained by our approach can synthesize motions from unstructured reference data of general guitar-playing practice motions, and accurately play diverse rhythms with complex chord pressing and string picking patterns based on the input guitar tabs that do not exist in the references. Along with this paper, we provide the motion capture data that we collected as the reference for policy training. Code is available at: https://pei-xu.github.io/guitar.

Compositional reinforcement learning is a promising approach for training policies to perform complex long-horizon tasks. Typically, a high-level task is decomposed into a sequence of subtasks and a separate policy is trained to perform each subtask. In this paper, we focus on the problem of training subtask policies in a way that they can be used to perform any task; here, a task is given by a sequence of subtasks. We aim to maximize the worst-case performance over all tasks as opposed to the average-case performance. We formulate the problem as a two agent zero-sum game in which the adversary picks the sequence of subtasks. We propose two RL algorithms to solve this game: one is an adaptation of existing multi-agent RL algorithms to our setting and the other is an asynchronous version which enables parallel training of subtask policies. We evaluate our approach on two multi-task environments with continuous states and actions and demonstrate that our algorithms outperform state-of-the-art baselines.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training intelligent agents. However, existing methods typically employ binary rewards that fail to capture quality differences among trajectories achieving identical outcomes, thereby overlooking potential diversity within the solution space. Inspired by the ``sweet spot'' concept in tennis-the racket's core region that produces optimal hitting effects, we introduce Sweet Spot Learning (SSL), a novel framework that provides differentiated guidance for agent optimization. SSL follows a simple yet effective principle: progressively amplified, tiered rewards guide policies toward the sweet-spot region of the solution space. This principle naturally adapts across diverse tasks: visual perception tasks leverage distance-tiered modeling to reward proximity, while complex reasoning tasks reward incremental progress toward promising solutions. We theoretically demonstrate that SSL preserves optimal solution ordering and enhances the gradient signal-to-noise ratio, thereby fostering more directed optimization. Extensive experiments across GUI perception, short/long-term planning, and complex reasoning tasks show consistent improvements over strong baselines on 12 benchmarks, achieving up to 2.5X sample efficiency gains and effective cross-task transferability. Our work establishes SSL as a general principle for training capable and robust agents.

The Multi-agent Path Finding (MAPF) problem involves finding collision-free paths for a team of agents in a known, static environment, with important applications in warehouse automation, logistics, or last-mile delivery. To meet the needs of these large-scale applications, current learning-based methods often deploy the same fully trained, decentralized network to all agents to improve scalability. However, such parameter sharing typically results in homogeneous behaviors among agents, which may prevent agents from breaking ties around symmetric conflict (e.g., bottlenecks) and might lead to live-/deadlocks. In this paper, we propose SYLPH, a novel learning-based MAPF framework aimed to mitigate the adverse effects of homogeneity by allowing agents to learn and dynamically select different social behaviors (akin to individual, dynamic roles), without affecting the scalability offered by parameter sharing. Specifically, SYLPH agents learn to select their Social Value Orientation (SVO) given the situation at hand, quantifying their own level of selfishness/altruism, as well as an SVO-conditioned MAPF policy dictating their movement actions. To these ends, each agent first determines the most influential other agent in the system by predicting future conflicts/interactions with other agents. Each agent selects its own SVO towards that agent, and trains its decentralized MAPF policy to enact this SVO until another agent becomes more influential. To further allow agents to consider each others' social preferences, each agent gets access to the SVO value of their neighbors. As a result of this hierarchical decision-making and exchange of social preferences, SYLPH endows agents with the ability to reason about the MAPF task through more latent spaces and nuanced contexts, leading to varied responses that can help break ties around symmetric conflicts. [...]

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

We introduce Stackelberg Learning from Human Feedback (SLHF), a new framework for preference optimization. SLHF frames the alignment problem as a sequential-move game between two policies: a Leader, which commits to an action, and a Follower, which responds conditionally on the Leader's action. This approach decomposes preference optimization into a refinement problem for the Follower and an optimization problem against an adversary for the Leader. Unlike Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), which assigns scalar rewards to actions, or Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF), which seeks a simultaneous-move equilibrium, SLHF leverages the asymmetry of sequential play to capture richer preference structures. The sequential design of SLHF naturally enables inference-time refinement, as the Follower learns to improve the Leader's actions, and these refinements can be leveraged through iterative sampling. We compare the solution concepts of SLHF, RLHF, and NLHF, and lay out key advantages in consistency, data sensitivity, and robustness to intransitive preferences. Experiments on large language models demonstrate that SLHF achieves strong alignment across diverse preference datasets, scales from 0.5B to 8B parameters, and yields inference-time refinements that transfer across model families without further fine-tuning.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Lipschitz constants are connected to many properties of neural networks, such as robustness, fairness, and generalization. Existing methods for computing Lipschitz constants either produce relatively loose upper bounds or are limited to small networks. In this paper, we develop an efficient framework for computing the ell_infty local Lipschitz constant of a neural network by tightly upper bounding the norm of Clarke Jacobian via linear bound propagation. We formulate the computation of local Lipschitz constants with a linear bound propagation process on a high-order backward graph induced by the chain rule of Clarke Jacobian. To enable linear bound propagation, we derive tight linear relaxations for specific nonlinearities in Clarke Jacobian. This formulate unifies existing ad-hoc approaches such as RecurJac, which can be seen as a special case of ours with weaker relaxations. The bound propagation framework also allows us to easily borrow the popular Branch-and-Bound (BaB) approach from neural network verification to further tighten Lipschitz constants. Experiments show that on tiny models, our method produces comparable bounds compared to exact methods that cannot scale to slightly larger models; on larger models, our method efficiently produces tighter results than existing relaxed or naive methods, and our method scales to much larger practical models that previous works could not handle. We also demonstrate an application on provable monotonicity analysis. Code is available at https://github.com/shizhouxing/Local-Lipschitz-Constants.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Multi-agent systems can improve reliability, yet under a fixed inference budget they often help, saturate, or even collapse. We develop a minimal and calibratable theory that predicts these regimes from three binding constraints of modern agent stacks: finite context windows, lossy inter-agent communication, and shared failures among similar agents. Each leaf agent is summarized by a compute-performance scaling exponent β; communication is captured by a message-length fidelity curve γ(m); dependence is captured by an effective shared-error correlation ρ; and a context window W imposes hard fan-in limits that make hierarchy necessary. For binary success/failure tasks with majority aggregation, we prove a sharp phase transition for deep b-ary trees with correlated inputs and lossy communication: a single scalar α_ρ (combining γ(m), ρ, and fan-in b) determines whether weak signal is amplified to a nontrivial fixed point or washed out to chance. In the amplifying regime, we derive an organization exponent s and show that budgeted synergy, i.e., outperforming the best single agent under the same total budget, occurs exactly when s>β, yielding closed-form compute allocation rules and explicit budget thresholds. We further characterize saturation via a mixing depth and provide a conservative clipped predictor that remains accurate across growth and saturation. A continuous-performance warm-up gives closed-form risks for star, chain, and tree organizations, making correlation- and communication-induced floors explicit and exposing the core design trade-offs in a smooth setting. Finally, we validate the predicted phase boundaries in controlled synthetic simulations and show how the same mechanisms explain the dominant bottlenecks reported in recent large-scale matched-budget studies of LLM agent-system scaling.

Current game world models simulate environments from a subjective, player-centric perspective. However, by treating the Non-Player Character (NPC) merely as background pixels, these models cannot capture interactions between the player and NPC. In that sense, they act as passive video renderers rather than real simulation engines, lacking the physical understanding needed to model action-induced NPC reactivities. We introduce ReactiveGWM, a reactive game world model that synthesizes dynamic interactions between the player and NPC. Instead of entangling all interaction dynamics, ReactiveGWM explicitly decouples player controls from NPC behaviors. Player actions are injected into the diffusion backbone via a lightweight additive bias, while high-level NPC responses (e.g., Offense, Control, Defense) are grounded through cross-attention modules. Crucially, these modules learn a game-agnostic representation of interactive logic. This enables zero-shot strategy transfer: our learned modules can be plugged directly into off-the-shelf, unannotated world models of different games. This instantly unlocks steerable NPC interactions without any domain-specific retraining. Evaluated on two Street Fighter games, ReactiveGWM maintains fine-grain player controllability while achieving robust, prompt-aligned NPC strategy adherence, paving the way for scalable, strategy-rich interaction with the NPC.

SARSA, a classical on-policy control algorithm for reinforcement learning, is known to chatter when combined with linear function approximation: SARSA does not diverge but oscillates in a bounded region. However, little is known about how fast SARSA converges to that region and how large the region is. In this paper, we make progress towards this open problem by showing the convergence rate of projected SARSA to a bounded region. Importantly, the region is much smaller than the region that we project into, provided that the magnitude of the reward is not too large. Existing works regarding the convergence of linear SARSA to a fixed point all require the Lipschitz constant of SARSA's policy improvement operator to be sufficiently small; our analysis instead applies to arbitrary Lipschitz constants and thus characterizes the behavior of linear SARSA for a new regime.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Language Model (LM)-based agents remain largely untested in mixed-motive settings where agents must leverage short-term cooperation for long-term competitive goals (e.g., multi-party politics). We introduce Cooperate to Compete (C2C), a multi-agent environment where players can engage in private negotiations while competing to be the first to achieve their secret objective. Players have asymmetric objectives and negotiations are non-binding, allowing alliances to form and break as players' short-term interests align and diverge. We run AI only games and conduct a user study pitting human players against AI opponents. We identify significant differences between human and AI negotiation behaviors, finding that humans favor lower-complexity deals and are significantly less reliable partners compared to LM-based agents. We also find that humans are more aggressive negotiators, accepting deals without a counteroffer only 56.3% of the time compared to 67.6% for LM-based agents. Through targeted prompting inspired by these findings, we modify agents' negotiation behavior and improve win rates from 22.2% to 32.7%. We run over 1,100 games with over 16,000 private conversations totaling 15.2 million tokens and over 150,000 player actions. Our results establish C2C as a testbed for studying and building LM-based agents that can navigate the sophisticated coordination required for real-world deployments. The game, code, and dataset may be found at https://negotiationgame.io/c2c.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Recent advances in generative world models have enabled remarkable progress in creating open-ended game environments, evolving from static scene synthesis toward dynamic, interactive simulation. However, current approaches remain limited by rigid action schemas and high annotation costs, restricting their ability to model diverse in-game interactions and player-driven dynamics. To address these challenges, we introduce Hunyuan-GameCraft-2, a new paradigm of instruction-driven interaction for generative game world modeling. Instead of relying on fixed keyboard inputs, our model allows users to control game video contents through natural language prompts, keyboard, or mouse signals, enabling flexible and semantically rich interaction within generated worlds. We formally defined the concept of interactive video data and developed an automated process to transform large-scale, unstructured text-video pairs into causally aligned interactive datasets. Built upon a 14B image-to-video Mixture-of-Experts(MoE) foundation model, our model incorporates a text-driven interaction injection mechanism for fine-grained control over camera motion, character behavior, and environment dynamics. We introduce an interaction-focused benchmark, InterBench, to evaluate interaction performance comprehensively. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our model generates temporally coherent and causally grounded interactive game videos that faithfully respond to diverse and free-form user instructions such as "open the door", "draw a torch", or "trigger an explosion".

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Multimodal models are increasingly deployed to solve tasks collaboratively with humans or other artificial agents. Existing benchmarks show that these models possess many of the required component capabilities, but the conditions that coincide in collaboration, including time pressure, information asymmetry, and imperfect communication, are usually studied in isolation. We introduce GPTNT, a benchmark built on the cooperative video game Keep Talking and Nobody Explodes, in which two agents must coordinate to defuse procedurally generated bomb puzzles against a live countdown. One agent can see and manipulate the bomb but does not have the defusal instructions; the other has the instructions but cannot see or manipulate the bomb. Neither agent can succeed alone: success requires effective and efficient communication. Unlike turn-based proxies, GPTNT requires agents to act asynchronously and communicate in real time. GPTNT is designed to separate collaboration from reliance on memorized solutions: the instruction manual, the partner, or both can be withheld to isolate what a model derives in the moment from what it already knows. We show that GPTNT poses a substantial challenge for state-of-the-art systems: none of the closed- or open-source models we test defuses a single bomb in real time, a bar that human players clear. Through controlled experiments, we identify critical weaknesses in state tracking, efficient action under time pressure, ambiguity handling, and error recovery. We release GPTNT as a benchmark for collaborative performance that current evaluations leave unmeasured. Because it runs on the real game, GPTNT benefits from procedural generation and inherits a living modding community, allowing the benchmark to evolve as models improve rather than being solved once and retired.

Lip synchronization is the task of aligning a speaker's lip movements in video with corresponding speech audio, and it is essential for creating realistic, expressive video content. However, existing methods often rely on reference frames and masked-frame inpainting, which limit their robustness to identity consistency, pose variations, facial occlusions, and stylized content. In addition, since audio signals provide weaker conditioning than visual cues, lip shape leakage from the original video will affect lip sync quality. In this paper, we present OmniSync, a universal lip synchronization framework for diverse visual scenarios. Our approach introduces a mask-free training paradigm using Diffusion Transformer models for direct frame editing without explicit masks, enabling unlimited-duration inference while maintaining natural facial dynamics and preserving character identity. During inference, we propose a flow-matching-based progressive noise initialization to ensure pose and identity consistency, while allowing precise mouth-region editing. To address the weak conditioning signal of audio, we develop a Dynamic Spatiotemporal Classifier-Free Guidance (DS-CFG) mechanism that adaptively adjusts guidance strength over time and space. We also establish the AIGC-LipSync Benchmark, the first evaluation suite for lip synchronization in diverse AI-generated videos. Extensive experiments demonstrate that OmniSync significantly outperforms prior methods in both visual quality and lip sync accuracy, achieving superior results in both real-world and AI-generated videos.

Assessing and comparing player skill in online multiplayer gaming environments is essential for fair matchmaking and player engagement. Traditional ranking models like Elo and Glicko-2, designed for two-player games, are insufficient for the complexity of multi-player, asymmetric team-based matches. To address this gap, the OpenSkill library offers a suite of sophisticated, fast, and adaptable models tailored for such dynamics. Drawing from Bayesian inference methods, OpenSkill provides a more accurate representation of individual player contributions and speeds up the computation of ranks. This paper introduces the OpenSkill library, featuring a Python implementation of the Plackett-Luce model among others, highlighting its performance advantages and predictive accuracy against proprietary systems like TrueSkill. OpenSkill is a valuable tool for game developers and researchers, ensuring a responsive and fair gaming experience by efficiently adjusting player rankings based on game outcomes. The library's support for time decay and diligent documentation further aid in its practical application, making it a robust solution for the nuanced world of multiplayer ranking systems. This paper also acknowledges areas for future enhancement, such as partial play and contribution weighting, emphasizing the library's ongoing development to meet the evolving needs of online gaming communities.

The synthesis of synchronized audio-visual content is a key challenge in generative AI, with open-source models facing challenges in robust audio-video alignment. Our analysis reveals that this issue is rooted in three fundamental challenges of the joint diffusion process: (1) Correspondence Drift, where concurrently evolving noisy latents impede stable learning of alignment; (2) inefficient global attention mechanisms that fail to capture fine-grained temporal cues; and (3) the intra-modal bias of conventional Classifier-Free Guidance (CFG), which enhances conditionality but not cross-modal synchronization. To overcome these challenges, we introduce Harmony, a novel framework that mechanistically enforces audio-visual synchronization. We first propose a Cross-Task Synergy training paradigm to mitigate drift by leveraging strong supervisory signals from audio-driven video and video-driven audio generation tasks. Then, we design a Global-Local Decoupled Interaction Module for efficient and precise temporal-style alignment. Finally, we present a novel Synchronization-Enhanced CFG (SyncCFG) that explicitly isolates and amplifies the alignment signal during inference. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Harmony establishes a new state-of-the-art, significantly outperforming existing methods in both generation fidelity and, critically, in achieving fine-grained audio-visual synchronization.

This paper presents a robust, distributed algorithm to solve general linear programs. The algorithm design builds on the characterization of the solutions of the linear program as saddle points of a modified Lagrangian function. We show that the resulting continuous-time saddle-point algorithm is provably correct but, in general, not distributed because of a global parameter associated with the nonsmooth exact penalty function employed to encode the inequality constraints of the linear program. This motivates the design of a discontinuous saddle-point dynamics that, while enjoying the same convergence guarantees, is fully distributed and scalable with the dimension of the solution vector. We also characterize the robustness against disturbances and link failures of the proposed dynamics. Specifically, we show that it is integral-input-to-state stable but not input-to-state stable. The latter fact is a consequence of a more general result, that we also establish, which states that no algorithmic solution for linear programming is input-to-state stable when uncertainty in the problem data affects the dynamics as a disturbance. Our results allow us to establish the resilience of the proposed distributed dynamics to disturbances of finite variation and recurrently disconnected communication among the agents. Simulations in an optimal control application illustrate the results.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Gradient-variation online learning has drawn increasing attention due to its deep connections to game theory, optimization, etc. It has been studied extensively in the full-information setting, but is underexplored with bandit feedback. In this work, we focus on gradient variation in Bandit Convex Optimization (BCO) with two-point feedback. By proposing a refined analysis on the non-consecutive gradient variation, a fundamental quantity in gradient variation with bandits, we improve the dimension dependence for both convex and strongly convex functions compared with the best known results (Chiang et al., 2013). Our improved analysis for the non-consecutive gradient variation also implies other favorable problem-dependent guarantees, such as gradient-variance and small-loss regrets. Beyond the two-point setup, we demonstrate the versatility of our technique by achieving the first gradient-variation bound for one-point bandit linear optimization over hyper-rectangular domains. Finally, we validate the effectiveness of our results in more challenging tasks such as dynamic/universal regret minimization and bandit games, establishing the first gradient-variation dynamic and universal regret bounds for two-point BCO and fast convergence rates in bandit games.

Action-conditioned video world models require low-latency causal generation and reliable responses to game-native controls. Although causal distillation enables one- or few-step video synthesis, extending it to interactive world models remains challenging, as discrete keyboard states and continuous mouse motion must remain aligned with temporally compressed latent chunks during causal training and autoregressive rollout. We introduce ForgeWM, a progressive framework that transforms a bidirectional action-conditioned video generator into efficient few-step world models through domain adaptation, teacher-forced causal training, causal consistency distillation, and on-policy distribution matching with a bidirectional teacher. The resulting budget-specialized students operate at steady-state denoising budgets of 1, 2, and 4 steps. ForgeWM further supports a dual-path deployment protocol combining latency-critical interaction with optional replay-time refinement, where the one-step student re-noises and refines its saved draft. On paired Minecraft trajectories, ForgeWM leads the evaluated systems in Imaging Quality, reference-aligned motion-profile agreement, action-sign accuracy, and mouse-control accuracy, while achieving the lowest reference LPIPS; the same four-stage recipe transfers to gamepad-controlled FPS gameplay. Replay-time refinement matches four-step reference quality while remaining roughly three times closer to the experienced trajectory than regeneration from noise. These results demonstrate ForgeWM's effectiveness for controllable few-step video generation.

Since Isaac Newton first studied the Kissing Number Problem in 1694, determining the maximal number of non-overlapping spheres around a central sphere has remained a fundamental challenge. This problem is the local analogue of Hilbert's 18th problem, bridging geometry, number theory, and information theory. Although significant progress has been made through lattices and codes, the irregularities of high-dimensional geometry, dimensional structure variability, and combinatorial explosion beyond Go limit the scalability and generality of existing methods. Here we model the problem as a two-player matrix completion game and train the reinforcement learning system, PackingStar, to play the games. The matrix entries represent pairwise cosines of sphere center vectors. One player fills entries while another corrects suboptimal ones to improve exploration quality, cooperatively maximizing the matrix size, corresponding to the kissing number. These matrices are decomposed into representative substructures, providing diverse bases and structural constraints that steer subsequent games and make extremely large spaces tractable. PackingStar surpasses records from dimensions 25 to 31 and sets new lower bounds for generalized kissing numbers under various angular constraints. It achieves the first breakthrough beyond rational structures from 1971 in 13 dimensions and discovers over 6000 new structures in other dimensions. Notably, some configurations challenge long-held antipodal paradigms, revealing algebraic correspondences with finite simple groups as well as geometric relationships across dimensions. Inspired by these patterns, humans devised further improved constructions. These results demonstrate AI's power to explore high-dimensional spaces beyond human intuition via extreme-scale reinforcement learning and open new pathways for the Kissing Number Problem and broader geometry research.

Generating full-length, high-quality songs is challenging, as it requires maintaining long-term coherence both across text and music modalities and within the music modality itself. Existing non-autoregressive (NAR) frameworks, while capable of producing high-quality songs, often struggle with the alignment between lyrics and vocal. Concurrently, catering to diverse musical preferences necessitates reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). However, existing methods often rely on merging multiple models during multi-preference optimization, which results in significant performance degradation. To address these challenges, we introduce DiffRhythm 2, an end-to-end framework designed for high-fidelity, controllable song generation. To tackle the lyric alignment problem, DiffRhythm 2 employs a semi-autoregressive architecture based on block flow matching. This design enables faithful alignment of lyrics to singing vocals without relying on external labels and constraints, all while preserving the high generation quality and efficiency of NAR models. To make this framework computationally tractable for long sequences, we implement a music variational autoencoder (VAE) that achieves a low frame rate of 5 Hz while still enabling high-fidelity audio reconstruction. In addition, to overcome the limitations of multi-preference optimization in RLHF, we propose cross-pair preference optimization. This method effectively mitigates the performance drop typically associated with model merging, allowing for more robust optimization across diverse human preferences. We further enhance musicality and structural coherence by introducing stochastic block representation alignment loss.

True video intelligence demands more than recognizing what is visible: it requires reasoning about why events unfold, predicting what would change under different conditions, and deciding what to do next. We refer to this progression, from perception through causal reasoning and simulation to strategic planning, as Strategic Video Intelligence (SVI). No existing benchmark evaluates this capability stack: in-the-wild videos lack verifiable ground truth for causal and strategic questions, while synthetic environments sacrifice the complexity of real multi-agent systems. To bridge this gap, we introduce SVI-Bench, a large-scale benchmark that leverages team sports as a dynamic microworld, combining the complexity of real-world multi-agent interaction (10-22 agents making coordinated decisions under adversarial pressure) with the verifiability of explicit rules and definitive outcomes. SVI-Bench comprises approximately 35K hours of broadcast video, 15M annotated actions, 15K hours of expert commentary, 23K game reports, and 103K structured statistical records across basketball, soccer, and hockey, all constructed via a data engine that transforms raw game data into a dense, cross-referenced corpus. We organize evaluation into 9 tasks spanning a progressive four-pillar hierarchy: Dynamic Scene Understanding, Causal Reasoning, Strategic Simulation, and Agentic Synthesis. Evaluating strong multimodal and agentic baselines, we find a capability cliff: models perform competently on perceptual tasks, achieving approximately 73% on fine-grained action QA, but degrade sharply at each successive cognitive level. Agentic tasks prove hardest: the strongest model achieves only 5% accuracy when required to autonomously gather and integrate evidence across a corpus of 1.8M clips.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are reshaping the game industry, particularly with more intelligent and human-preferable game characters. However, existing game benchmarks fall short of practical needs: they lack evaluations of diverse LLM capabilities across various game genres, studies of agentic modules crucial for complex gameplay, and fine-tuning datasets for aligning pre-trained LLMs into gaming agents. To fill these gaps, we present \benchname{}, a foundational benchmark designed to train and evaluate LLM agents across diverse real-world video games. Unlike existing benchmarks, Orak includes 12 popular video games spanning all major genres, enabling comprehensive studies of LLM capabilities and agentic modules essential for intricate game scenarios. To support consistent evaluation of LLMs, we introduce a plug-and-play interface based on Model Context Protocol (MCP) that enables LLMs to seamlessly connect with games and manipulate agentic modules. Additionally, we propose a fine-tuning dataset, consisting of LLM gameplay trajectories across diverse game genres. Orak offers a comprehensive evaluation framework, encompassing general game score leaderboards, LLM battle arenas, and in-depth analyses of visual input state, agentic strategies, and fine-tuning effects, establishing a foundation towards building generic gaming agents. Code is available at https://github.com/krafton-ai/Orak.

Open-ended real-world interaction admits multiple valid behaviors: an agent may answer directly, ask for clarification, provide progress updates, or confirm before acting. This flexibility breaks a core assumption behind group-based RL: rollouts compared within a group are no longer guaranteed to be behaviorally comparable. As a result, reward-model preferences over interaction style can distort relative advantages and steer optimization toward reward-preferred behaviors rather than context-appropriate ones. We formalize this as a reward fairness problem and propose ARC (Advantage Regularization via Conditioning), a training recipe that restores fairer relative comparison through strategy-conditioned rollout grouping, together with hybrid rewards and entropy regularization. We study ARC in our proposed \inter, a novel paradigm for responsive, steerable, and execution-aware user-agent interaction that decouples user-visible communication from latent reasoning and tool use. \inter\ also provides the annotation and distillation pipeline for constructing \inter-86K, our strategy-annotated training corpus for supervised and RL training. Empirically, ARC substantially strengthens the core τ/τ^2 tool-use benchmarks, while \inter\ reduces time-to-first-token from 4.91s to 1.27s relative to a think-style baseline. Together, these results suggest that a central bottleneck in open-ended interactive learning is not only how agents are rewarded, but whether their behaviors are compared fairly in the first place. The ARC implementation and \inter-86K training data will be released.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

Convergent Cross Mapping (CCM) is a powerful method for detecting causality in coupled nonlinear dynamical systems, providing a model-free approach to capture dynamic causal interactions. Partial Cross Mapping (PCM) was introduced as an extension of CCM to address indirect causality in three-variable systems by comparing cross-mapping quality between direct cause-effect mapping and indirect mapping through an intermediate conditioning variable. However, PCM remains limited to univariate delay embeddings in its cross-mapping processes. In this work, we extend PCM to the multivariate setting, introducing multiPCM, which leverages multivariate embeddings to more effectively distinguish indirect causal relationships. We further propose a multivariate cross-mapping framework (MXMap) for causal discovery in dynamical systems. This two-phase framework combines (1) pairwise CCM tests to establish an initial causal graph and (2) multiPCM to refine the graph by pruning indirect causal connections. Through experiments on simulated data and the ERA5 Reanalysis weather dataset, we demonstrate the effectiveness of MXMap. Additionally, MXMap is compared against several baseline methods, showing advantages in accuracy and causal graph refinement.

While LLM-based agents excel at individual tasks, effective collaboration with realistic human partners remains challenging. Most of the existing conversation-level collaborative studies lack grounded interaction and behavioral execution, motivating the need for cooperative game environments that enable contextualized and immersive collaboration. To this end, this paper proposes CollabBench, a benchmark for evaluating and training collaborative agents in cooperative games. CollabBench features a Diverse Player Profile Simulation pipeline to model varied players behaviors, and a Collaborative Agentic Training paradigm that unifies reasoning, communication, and action via agentic rollouts, optimized with a hybrid reward balancing task efficiency and affective adaptation. We further extend classic environments to CWAH-MultiPlayer and Cook-MultiPlayer for systematic evaluation under diverse personalities. Experiments with efficiency and affective metrics show that our trained models outperform base models, achieving 19.5% higher efficiency and 24.4% improved affective performance. Further analysis reveals key collaborative limitations of existing models and offers insights for future collaborative training.

Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch -- attackers overfit to obsolete defenses, while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we propose Self-RedTeam, an online self-play reinforcement learning algorithm where an attacker and defender agent co-evolve through continuous interaction. We cast safety alignment as a two-player zero-sum game, where a single model alternates between attacker and defender roles -- generating adversarial prompts and safeguarding against them -- while a reward LM adjudicates outcomes. This enables dynamic co-adaptation. Grounded in the game-theoretic framework of zero-sum games, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee which motivates the design of our method: if self-play converges to a Nash Equilibrium, the defender will reliably produce safe responses to any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam uncovers more diverse attacks (+21.8% SBERT) compared to attackers trained against static defenders and achieves higher robustness on safety benchmarks (e.g., +65.5% on WildJailBreak) than defenders trained against static attackers. We further propose hidden Chain-of-Thought, allowing agents to plan privately, which boosts adversarial diversity and reduces over-refusals. Our results motivate a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution in LM safety training, enabling scalable, autonomous, and robust self-improvement of LMs via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).

We present an experimental implementation of the multiplayer Quantum Volunteer's Dilemma on noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) hardware, executed on the ibm_kingston backend via Qiskit Runtime. The game is evaluated for N = 2 to 9 players under four transpiler optimization levels, with 20 independent repetitions per configuration and 2048 shots per circuit, including post-processing readout error correction via mthree. Target-state fidelity decays with system size but remains above 70% (corrected) through N = 9. With readout correction, the global average payoff reproduces the quantum theoretical benchmark exactly for N <= 6 and exceeds the classical Nash equilibrium across the full tested range. Optimization level 2 is selected as the reference configuration after gate count analysis reveals that levels 2 and 3 produce identical transpiled circuits, with level 2 achieving superior fidelity stability. A Hamming distance analysis of raw measurement counts shows that single-qubit errors dominate at small N, with multi-qubit contributions growing beyond N = 6. A calibration-based digital twin captures global payoff trends but exhibits a linear fidelity decay profile that diverges from the hardware behavior at large N, exposing the limits of first-order independent per-qubit noise models. These results demonstrate that aggregate quantum advantage in multiplayer games is robust to NISQ noise conditions across the full tested range, while the practical observability of state-level advantage is constrained to N <= 8 under post-processed readout correction.

Text-conditioned motion synthesis has made remarkable progress with the emergence of diffusion models. However, the majority of these motion diffusion models are primarily designed for a single character and overlook multi-human interactions. In our approach, we strive to explore this problem by synthesizing human motion with interactions for a group of characters of any size in a zero-shot manner. The key aspect of our approach is the adaptation of human-wise interactions as pairs of human joints that can be either in contact or separated by a desired distance. In contrast to existing methods that necessitate training motion generation models on multi-human motion datasets with a fixed number of characters, our approach inherently possesses the flexibility to model human interactions involving an arbitrary number of individuals, thereby transcending the limitations imposed by the training data. We introduce a novel controllable motion generation method, InterControl, to encourage the synthesized motions maintaining the desired distance between joint pairs. It consists of a motion controller and an inverse kinematics guidance module that realistically and accurately aligns the joints of synthesized characters to the desired location. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the distance between joint pairs for human-wise interactions can be generated using an off-the-shelf Large Language Model (LLM). Experimental results highlight the capability of our framework to generate interactions with multiple human characters and its potential to work with off-the-shelf physics-based character simulators.

Reinforcement learning (RL) paradigms have demonstrated strong performance on reasoning-intensive tasks such as code generation. However, limited trajectory diversity often leads to diminishing returns, which constrains the achievable performance ceiling. Search-enhanced RL alleviates this issue by introducing structured exploration, which remains constrained by the single-agent policy priors. Meanwhile, leveraging multiple interacting policies can acquire more diverse exploratory signals, but existing approaches are typically decoupled from structured search. We propose MARS^2 (Multi-Agent Reinforced Tree-Search Scaling), a unified RL framework in which multiple independently-optimized agents collaborate within a shared tree-structured search environment. MARS^2 models the search tree as a learnable multi-agent interaction environment, enabling heterogeneous agents to collaboratively generate and refine candidate solutions within a shared search topology. To support effective learning, we introduce a path-level group advantage formulation based on tree-consistent reward shaping, which facilitates effective credit assignment across complex search trajectories. Experiments on code generation benchmarks show that MARS^2 consistently improves performance across diverse model combinations and training settings, demonstrating the effectiveness of coupling multi-agent collaboration with tree search for enhancing reinforcement learning. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/TsinghuaC3I/MARTI.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been shown effective for cooperative games in recent years. However, existing state-of-the-art methods face challenges related to sample complexity, training instability, and the risk of converging to a suboptimal Nash Equilibrium. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for learning stochastic policies to resolve these issues. We embed cooperative MARL problems into probabilistic graphical models, from which we derive the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) objective for MARL. Based on the MaxEnt framework, we propose Heterogeneous-Agent Soft Actor-Critic (HASAC) algorithm. Theoretically, we prove the monotonic improvement and convergence to quantal response equilibrium (QRE) properties of HASAC. Furthermore, we generalize a unified template for MaxEnt algorithmic design named Maximum Entropy Heterogeneous-Agent Mirror Learning (MEHAML), which provides any induced method with the same guarantees as HASAC. We evaluate HASAC on six benchmarks: Bi-DexHands, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge, Google Research Football, Multi-Agent Particle Environment, and Light Aircraft Game. Results show that HASAC consistently outperforms strong baselines, exhibiting better sample efficiency, robustness, and sufficient exploration.

We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it would imply the possibility of creating strong AI agents with minimal human intervention. We ask two LLMs to negotiate with each other, playing the roles of a buyer and a seller, respectively. They aim to reach a deal with the buyer targeting a lower price and the seller a higher one. A third language model, playing the critic, provides feedback to a player to improve the player's negotiation strategies. We let the two agents play multiple rounds, using previous negotiation history and AI feedback as in-context demonstrations to improve the model's negotiation strategy iteratively. We use different LLMs (GPT and Claude) for different roles and use the deal price as the evaluation metric. Our experiments reveal multiple intriguing findings: (1) Only a subset of the language models we consider can self-play and improve the deal price from AI feedback, weaker models either do not understand the game's rules or cannot incorporate AI feedback for further improvement. (2) Models' abilities to learn from the feedback differ when playing different roles. For example, it is harder for Claude-instant to improve as the buyer than as the seller. (3) When unrolling the game to multiple rounds, stronger agents can consistently improve their performance by meaningfully using previous experiences and iterative AI feedback, yet have a higher risk of breaking the deal. We hope our work provides insightful initial explorations of having models autonomously improve each other with game playing and AI feedback.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

We study the robust interpolation problem of arbitrary data distributions supported on a bounded space and propose a two-fold law of robustness. Robust interpolation refers to the problem of interpolating n noisy training data points in R^d by a Lipschitz function. Although this problem has been well understood when the samples are drawn from an isoperimetry distribution, much remains unknown concerning its performance under generic or even the worst-case distributions. We prove a Lipschitzness lower bound Omega(n/p) of the interpolating neural network with p parameters on arbitrary data distributions. With this result, we validate the law of robustness conjecture in prior work by Bubeck, Li, and Nagaraj on two-layer neural networks with polynomial weights. We then extend our result to arbitrary interpolating approximators and prove a Lipschitzness lower bound Omega(n^{1/d}) for robust interpolation. Our results demonstrate a two-fold law of robustness: i) we show the potential benefit of overparametrization for smooth data interpolation when n=poly(d), and ii) we disprove the potential existence of an O(1)-Lipschitz robust interpolating function when n=exp(omega(d)).

Many existing reinforcement learning (RL) methods employ stochastic gradient iteration on the back end, whose stability hinges upon a hypothesis that the data-generating process mixes exponentially fast with a rate parameter that appears in the step-size selection. Unfortunately, this assumption is violated for large state spaces or settings with sparse rewards, and the mixing time is unknown, making the step size inoperable. In this work, we propose an RL methodology attuned to the mixing time by employing a multi-level Monte Carlo estimator for the critic, the actor, and the average reward embedded within an actor-critic (AC) algorithm. This method, which we call Multi-level Actor-Critic (MAC), is developed especially for infinite-horizon average-reward settings and neither relies on oracle knowledge of the mixing time in its parameter selection nor assumes its exponential decay; it, therefore, is readily applicable to applications with slower mixing times. Nonetheless, it achieves a convergence rate comparable to the state-of-the-art AC algorithms. We experimentally show that these alleviated restrictions on the technical conditions required for stability translate to superior performance in practice for RL problems with sparse rewards.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

We investigate the first-order differential calculus over extended metric-topological measure spaces. The latter are quartets mathbb X=(X,τ,{sf d},mathfrak m), given by an extended metric space (X,{sf d}) together with a weaker topology τ (satisfying suitable compatibility conditions) and a finite Radon measure mathfrak m on (X,τ). The class of extended metric-topological measure spaces encompasses all metric measure spaces and many infinite-dimensional metric-measure structures, such as abstract Wiener spaces. In this framework, we study the following classes of objects: - The Banach algebra {rm Lip}_b(X,τ,{sf d}) of bounded τ-continuous {sf d}-Lipschitz functions on X. - Several notions of Lipschitz derivations on X, defined in duality with {rm Lip}_b(X,τ,{sf d}). - The metric Sobolev space W^{1,p}(mathbb X), defined in duality with Lipschitz derivations on X. Inter alia, we generalise both Weaver's and Di Marino's theories of Lipschitz derivations to the extended setting, and we discuss their connections. We also introduce a Sobolev space W^{1,p}(mathbb X) via an integration-by-parts formula, along the lines of Di Marino's notion of Sobolev space, and we prove its equivalence with other approaches, studied in the extended setting by Ambrosio, Erbar and Savaré. En route, we obtain some results of independent interest, among which are: - A Lipschitz-constant-preserving extension result for τ-continuous {sf d}-Lipschitz functions. - A novel and rather robust strategy for proving the equivalence of Sobolev-type spaces defined via an integration-by-parts formula and those obtained with a relaxation procedure. - A new description of an isometric predual of the metric Sobolev space W^{1,p}(mathbb X).

As audio-visual generative models evolve into world simulators, cross-modal synchronization stands as a critical proxy for assessing the consistency of world dynamics and causality in generated content. However, existing evaluation metrics presume structural correctness, reducing synchronization to mere temporal alignment. Consequently, they fail on generative outputs, especially when exhibiting structural hallucinations and asymmetric cross-modal relations, which currently mandate expert human annotation to assess synchronization. This dependency introduces a critical paradox: human evaluators rely on relative, reference-dependent comparisons, whereas automated metrics require reference-free, absolute scalars. We resolve this paradox by proposing a framework that distills relative human perception into a continuous, globally consistent metric. First, we introduce SynthSync, a dataset of generative failures ranked via pairwise human annotations. Second, we adapt the Omni-LLM equipped with a continuous latent projection to translate relative human rankings into continuous absolute values. Third, we propose Real-Valued Group Relative Policy Optimization (R-GRPO) to internalize the global causal structure of synchronization via listwise score distributions. Empirically, our metric achieves state-of-the-art human preference alignment. We leverage this estimator to establish a standardized benchmark, advancing AV-Gen assessment from low-level signal correlation to visually grounded causality.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures achieve parameter efficiency through conditional computation, yet contemporary designs suffer from two fundamental limitations: structural parameter isolation that causes catastrophic forgetting, and instruction-overfitting that degrades performance in instruction-free scenarios. We propose CDSP-MoE (Conflict-Driven Subspace Pruning MoE), a framework that addresses these issues through a paradigm shift from isolated expert containers to dynamic expert instantiation within a shared physical subspace. Grounded in the Universal Weight Subspace Hypothesis, CDSP-MoE maintains a super-complete parameter backbone where logical experts are carved out via learnable topology masks. Unlike prior work that uses gradient conflict for token reassignment or optimization surgery, we leverage it as a structural supervisory signal: a Lagged Gradient Game penalizes interfering connections in the shared manifold, enabling the topology to spontaneously prune conflicting pathways and evolve interpretable modular structures. Experimental results demonstrate that CDSP-MoE achieves robust content-driven routing without human-defined task labels, maintaining semantic specialization even under strict blind inference protocols where explicit instructions are absent. Code is available at: https://github.com/konodiodaaaaa1/Conflict-Driven-Subspace-Pruning-Mixture-of-Experts

This paper studies attack detection for discrete-time linear systems with stochastic process noise that produce both a vulnerable (i.e., attackable) linear measurement and a secured (i.e., unattackable) quadratic measurement. The motivating application of this model is a dynamic-game setting where the quadratic measurement is interpreted as a system-level utility or reward, and control inputs into the linear system are interpreted as control policies that, once applied, are known to all game participants and which steer the system towards a game-theoretic equilibrium (e.g., Nash equilibrium). To detect attacks on the linear channel, we develop a novel quadratic-utility-aware observer that leverages the secured quadratic output and enforces measurement consistency via a projection step. We establish three properties for this observer: feasibility of the true state, prox-regularity of the quadratic-constraint set, and a monotone error-reduction guarantee in the noise-free case. To detect adversarial manipulation, we compare linear and quadratic observer trajectories using a wild bootstrap maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) test that provides valid inference under temporal dependence. We validate our framework using numerical experiments of a pursuit-evasion game, where the quadratic observer preserves estimation accuracy under linear-sensor attacks, while the statistical test detects distributional divergence between the observers' trajectories.

We study black-box optimization of Lipschitz functions under noisy evaluations. Existing adaptive discretization methods implicitly avoid suboptimal regions but do not provide explicit certificates of optimality or measurable progress guarantees. We introduce Certificate-Guided Pruning (CGP), which maintains an explicit active set A_t of potentially optimal points via confidence-adjusted Lipschitz envelopes. Any point outside A_t is certifiably suboptimal with high probability, and under a margin condition with near-optimality dimension α, we prove Vol(A_t) shrinks at a controlled rate yielding sample complexity tildeO(varepsilon^{-(2+α)}). We develop three extensions: CGP-Adaptive learns L online with O(log T) overhead; CGP-TR scales to d > 50 via trust regions with local certificates; and CGP-Hybrid switches to GP refinement when local smoothness is detected. Experiments on 12 benchmarks (d in [2, 100]) show CGP variants match or exceed strong baselines while providing principled stopping criteria via certificate volume.

In this paper, we provide a general framework for studying multi-agent online learning problems in the presence of delays and asynchronicities. Specifically, we propose and analyze a class of adaptive dual averaging schemes in which agents only need to accumulate gradient feedback received from the whole system, without requiring any between-agent coordination. In the single-agent case, the adaptivity of the proposed method allows us to extend a range of existing results to problems with potentially unbounded delays between playing an action and receiving the corresponding feedback. In the multi-agent case, the situation is significantly more complicated because agents may not have access to a global clock to use as a reference point; to overcome this, we focus on the information that is available for producing each prediction rather than the actual delay associated with each feedback. This allows us to derive adaptive learning strategies with optimal regret bounds, even in a fully decentralized, asynchronous environment. Finally, we also analyze an "optimistic" variant of the proposed algorithm which is capable of exploiting the predictability of problems with a slower variation and leads to improved regret bounds.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Behavior cloning is enjoying a resurgence in popularity as scaling both model and data sizes proves to provide a strong starting point for many tasks of interest. In this work, we introduce an open recipe for training a video game playing foundation model designed for inference in realtime on a consumer GPU. We release all data (8300+ hours of high quality human gameplay), training and inference code, and pretrained checkpoints under an open license. We show that our best model is capable of playing a variety of 3D video games at a level competitive with human play. We use this recipe to systematically examine the scaling laws of behavior cloning to understand how the model's performance and causal reasoning varies with model and data scale. We first show in a simple toy problem that, for some types of causal reasoning, increasing both the amount of training data and the depth of the network results in the model learning a more causal policy. We then systematically study how causality varies with the number of parameters (and depth) and training steps in scaled models of up to 1.2 billion parameters, and we find similar scaling results to what we observe in the toy problem.

In reinforcement learning and imitation learning, an object of central importance is the state distribution induced by the policy. It plays a crucial role in the policy gradient theorem, and references to it--along with the related state-action distribution--can be found all across the literature. Despite its importance, the state distribution is mostly discussed indirectly and theoretically, rather than being modeled explicitly. The reason being an absence of appropriate density estimation tools. In this work, we investigate applications of a normalizing flow-based model for the aforementioned distributions. In particular, we use a pair of flows coupled through the optimality point of the Donsker-Varadhan representation of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, for distribution matching based imitation learning. Our algorithm, Coupled Flow Imitation Learning (CFIL), achieves state-of-the-art performance on benchmark tasks with a single expert trajectory and extends naturally to a variety of other settings, including the subsampled and state-only regimes.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involves training policy models (PMs) and reward models (RMs) to align language models with human preferences. Instead of focusing solely on PMs and RMs independently, we propose to examine their interactions during fine-tuning, introducing the concept of seamlessness. Our study starts with observing the saturation phenomenon, where continual improvements in RM and PM do not translate into RLHF progress. Our analysis shows that RMs fail to assign proper scores to PM responses, resulting in a 35% mismatch rate with human preferences, highlighting a significant discrepancy between PM and RM. To measure seamlessness between PM and RM without human effort, we propose an automatic metric, SEAM. SEAM quantifies the discrepancies between PM and RM judgments induced by data samples. We validate the effectiveness of SEAM in data selection and model augmentation. Our experiments demonstrate that (1) using SEAM-filtered data for RL training improves RLHF performance by 4.5%, and (2) SEAM-guided model augmentation results in a 4% performance improvement over standard augmentation methods.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) has proven effective for training LLM-based agents with external tool-use capabilities. However, we identify that agentic RL training induces increasing redundant tool calls and blurs the model's intrinsic knowledge boundary, where the model fails to distinguish when tools are needed versus when parametric knowledge suffices. Existing solutions based on reward shaping create coarse-grained optimization targets that tend to incentivize indiscriminate tool-call suppression, leading to reward hacking. In this paper, we propose AKBE (Agentic Knowledge Boundary Enhancement), an on-policy method that dynamically probes the model's intrinsic knowledge boundary through dual-path (with-tool and no-tool) rollouts during training. We define the knowledge boundary as the per-instance determination of whether tools are required and the minimum tool calls necessary. By comparing correctness across paths, AKBE categorizes trajectories and constructs targeted supervisory signals that guide efficient tool-use patterns for each question. These signals are integrated seamlessly into the agentic RL training loop. Experiments on seven QA benchmarks demonstrate that AKBE improves task accuracy by +1.85 on average and reduces tool calls by 18% over standard agentic RL, yielding 25% higher tool productivity without any accuracy-efficiency trade-off. Further analysis suggests its plug-and-play compatibility across different RL algorithms and the mechanism of each signal category. Our code is available at https://github.com/CuSO4-Chen/AKBE.